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Copyright at Common Law in 1774
H. TOMÁS GÓMEZ-AROSTEGUI
As we approach Congress’s upcoming reexamination of copyright
law, participants are amassing ammunition for the battle to come over the
proper scope of copyright. One item that both sides have turned to is the
original purpose of copyright, as reflected in a pair of cases decided in
Great Britain in the late 18th century—the birthplace of Anglo-American
copyright. The salient issue is whether copyright was a natural or
customary right, protected at common law, or a privilege created solely by
statute. These differing viewpoints set the default basis of the right.
Whereas the former suggests the principal purpose was to protect authors,
the latter indicates that copyright should principally benefit the public.
The orthodox reading of these two cases is that copyright existed as
a common-law right inherent in authors. In recent years, however,
revisionist work has challenged that reading. Relying in part on the
discrepancies of 18th-century law reporting, scholars have argued that the
natural-rights and customary views were rejected. The modified account
has made great strides and has nearly displaced the traditional interpretation. Using a unique body of historical research, this Article constitutes
the first critical examination of the revision. Ultimately, it concludes that
the revision is incorrect and that we must return to the orthodox view.
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Copyright at Common Law in 1774
H. TOMÁS GÓMEZ-AROSTEGUI*

I. INTRODUCTION
As we approach Congress’s upcoming reexamination of copyright law,
academics and interest groups are amassing ammunition for the battle to
come over the proper scope of copyright. One item that both sides have
turned to is the original purpose of copyright, as reflected in a pair of cases
decided in Great Britain some 240 years ago. Both concern the very
genesis of authors’ rights, a topic of central importance to scholars and
lobbyists. In England, these two cases are often seen as the most important
and influential because they are thought to have largely exhausted the
subject, with subsequent cases recycling arguments and evidence previously considered. In the United States, they garner significant scholarly
attention because they were decided in the years before the adoption of the
Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution in 1787 and the first federal
Copyright Act of 1790.1 Thus, unlike cases decided on the subject decades
after 1790,2 they offer contemporaneous evidence of what the Framers and
the First Congress may have known and intended in those two instruments.
*

Kay Kitagawa & Andy Johnson-Laird IP Faculty Scholar and Associate Professor of Law,
Lewis & Clark Law School. Research at institutions in Great Britain and elsewhere was made possible
by a gift from Kay Kitagawa and Andy Johnson-Laird. I thank them for their very generous support.
This Article benefitted from comments received during presentations at George Mason University
School of Law, George Washington University Law School, Lewis & Clark Law School, and Stanford
Law School. Special thanks also go to Howard Abrams, Isabella Alexander, Lionel Bently, Michael
Bosson, Kathy Bowrey, Jane Bradney, Bill Cornish, Ronan Deazley, June Ellner, Jane Ginsburg,
Brendan Gooley, James Hamilton, Paul Heald, Steve Hobbs, Liz Hore, Lydia Loren, Hector
MacQueen, Leigh McKiernan, Joe Miller, Ruth Paley, Julian Pooley, Sarah Rajec, Mark Rose, Simon
Stern, Clare Thompson, and Lynn Williams for their comments on earlier versions of this Article or for
otherwise assisting in its preparation. Any errors are mine alone. Many sources for this Article are
stored in institutions in Canada, Great Britain, Ireland, and the United States. Locations are abbreviated
as follows: AL=Advocates Library, Edinburgh; Bodl=Bodleian Library; BL=British Library;
ERY=East Riding of Yorkshire Archives; HSP=Historical Society of Pennsylvania; KI=Hon. Society
of King’s Inns, Dublin; LI=Lincoln’s Inn Library; LMA=London Metropolitan Archives;
NAS=National Archives of Scotland; OHL=Osgoode Hall Law Library; PA=Parliamentary Archives;
PRO=Public Record Office, Kew; SL=Signet Library, Edinburgh; WCRO=Warwickshire County
Record Office; and WSA=Wiltshire & Swindon Archives. This Article also relies on a large number of
newspapers and periodicals, the full titles of which appear infra in the Appendix.
1
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
2
E.g., Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834); Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 H.L.C. 815 (H.L. 1854).
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The salient issue is whether, in the late 18th century, copyright was a
natural or customary property right, protected at common law, or a
privilege created solely by statute. These viewpoints compete to set the
default basis of the right. The former suggests the principal purpose was to
protect authors; the latter indicates it was principally to benefit the public.
The conventional view on this question, at least with respect to English
law, has been that copyright was a common-law right. This view follows
from our two cases. The first is Millar v. Taylor,3 a Court of King’s Bench
decision from 1769, which held that a common-law right existed separate
from and in spite of a statute enacted in 1710 that limited the duration of
copyrights. Copyrights were therefore perpetual. The second case is
Donaldson v. Becket,4 a House of Lords decision from 1774 that
overturned Millar. There, the House held that copyrights in published
works were governed by the 1710 statute and its limited durations. And
though the dispute did not require the House to decide if a common-law
right predated the statute, a majority of the judges who advised the Lords
opined that a right did exist before 1710, but that the statute abridged it. On
the basis of these judges’ views, succeeding generations have taken
Donaldson to endorse directly or indirectly an antecedent right in authors.
This long-accepted view of Donaldson has garnered sharp criticism. In
1983, Howard Abrams argued that the decision had been misinterpreted
due to misleading reports of the case and a misunderstanding of how the
House of Lords operated. By his lights, one finds the true import of
Donaldson not in the views of the judges, but solely in speeches delivered
by a handful of Lords. And because a majority of the Lords who spoke
rejected an antecedent right in published works, Abrams posits that the
House of Lords actually held that copyright never existed at common law
and thus that the true origin of copyright was strictly legislative.5 During
the last ten years, Ronan Deazley has taken the argument further. Focusing
on a part of the decision that Abrams did not, Deazley argues that the
House also ruled that authors never held any incorporeal rights to prevent
even the unauthorized first publication of their works.6 He thus seeks to put
the final nail in the 18th-century coffin of an author’s right at common law.
Their modified account has been influential, particularly with respect
to common-law rights in published works. The two most important
treatises on U.S. copyright law, for instance, have taken it to heart. Bill
Patry cites Deazley for the proposition that the “House of Lords found that

3

4 Burr. 2303 (K.B. 1769).
4 Burr. 2408, 7 Bro. P.C. 88 (H.L. 1774).
5
Howard A. Abrams, The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law: Exploding the Myth
of Common Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1119, 1128–29, 1156–70 (1983).
6
RONAN DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGIN OF THE RIGHT TO COPY 191–220 (2004).
4
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there was no common law [right] in published works.” And though David
Nimmer has yet to embrace the revised account wholeheartedly, he is
heading in that direction. His treatise recites the traditional view on the
matter but then states that Abrams has “convincingly argue[d] that in fact
the House of Lords in Donaldson rejected the notion of common law
copyright quite apart from any impact of the [statute of 1710].”8 Many
other scholars have accepted the revised account as well,9 and I even
counted myself among them,10 until recently. Liam O’Melinn perhaps
sums up the shift in thinking best when he writes, citing Abrams and
Deazley, that “common law and natural law copyright are fictions” and
that common-law copyright has been “fully and formally discredited.”11
This Article puts the story on a new footing or, more precisely, back on
an old one. Part II first discusses why copyright’s origin remains important
today, particularly in how it drives doctrinal and normative arguments. Part
III then provides the necessary context for understanding Donaldson. Here,
I briefly describe the statute enacted in 1710, commonly called the Statute
of Anne, and the decision in Millar. Parts IV and V, which constitute the
bulk of this Article, comprise an account of Donaldson, the historical
revision of Abrams and Deazley, and my response to it. Given that our
disagreement stems in large part from different understandings of the
procedures and records of the case, I pay particular attention to those areas.
Ultimately, I conclude that my friends have read the record too
aggressively and that they are wrong to assert that the House of Lords
affirmatively rejected a common-law right. First, newly discovered evidence demonstrates that Donaldson was not misreported in the manner my
colleagues contend. And second, no doctrine supports their contention that
the Lords’ speeches, standing alone, constituted the holding of the House.
Rather, the correct interpretation of the case is that the House, as a body,
7
3 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 7:4 (2014); accord William Patry, Metaphors
and Moral Panics in Copyright, 2008 INTELL. PROP. Q. 1, 7 & n.19.
8
1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 4.02[A][2] n.12.1
(2014).
9
E.g., SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 43, 200 n.17 (2001); Craig W. Dallon, The Problem
with Congress and Copyright Law: Forgetting the Past and Ignoring the Public Interest, 44 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 365, 413–15, 424 (2004); Edmund W. Kitch, Intellectual Property and the Common
Law, 78 VA. L. REV. 293, 295 n.12 (1992); Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 272, 335 (2004); L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and
Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 31 (1987); Catherine Seville, The Statute of Anne: Rhetoric and
Reception in the Nineteenth Century, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 819, 824–27 (2010); Molly Shaffer Van
Houweling, Author Autonomy and Atomism in Copyright Law, 96 VA. L. REV. 549, 577–78 (2010);
Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1149, 1230 n.328 (1998).
10
H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, What History Teaches Us About Copyright Injunctions and the
Inadequate-Remedy-at-Law Requirement, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1197, 1221 (2008).
11
Liam Séamus O’Melinn, The Recording Industry v. James Madison, aka “Publius”: The
Inversion of Culture and Copyright, 35 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 75, 79, 103 (2011).
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did not determine the origin of copyright, thus leaving the individual views
of the judges and law Lords in Donaldson, along with those in Millar, as
the principal guidance on the subject in England and America before 1800.
And consistent with the orthodox view of copyright’s origin, on the whole,
those jurists favored an antecedent common-law copyright in authors.
Notably, this Article does not address what connection, if any, one can
draw between Millar and Donaldson and the perception and intent of the
Framers and First Congress in formulating U.S. copyright policy. Scholars
have already covered that syllogistic step elsewhere, and though more
could certainly be said about it, this Article is not the place to do so.
II. DOCTRINAL AND NORMATIVE RELEVANCE
One might wonder why the origin and history of copyright law,
particularly English law from the 18th century, remain relevant today. The
answer is straightforward. English law continues to play a supporting role
in doctrinal and normative arguments over the proper scope of copyright.
In the United States, at least, there remain several areas where case law of
this vintage can directly influence copyright doctrine. The common laws of
the states, for instance, can protect sound recordings fixed before 1972.12
And thus we still see courts citing Millar and Donaldson to assess whether
to recognize a copyright in pre-1972 recordings.13 Our Supreme Court has
also cited 18th-century English case law when deciding whether a
copyright litigant has a right to a jury trial and in setting the default,
equitable remedial powers of the federal courts.14 Most recently and
notably, members of the Court consulted 18th-century sources on
common-law copyright in deciding whether legislative restoration of
copyright and increases to copyright duration were constitutional.15
Quite apart from particular doctrines, English law from this period
remains important because commentators and interest groups often turn to
it to support their normative arguments for how broad or narrow copyright
protection should be. The issue has become especially germane as we
move closer to what could soon become a comprehensive reconsideration
of federal copyright law, a step recently embraced by the Register of
Copyrights.16 In testimony before a congressional subcommittee on
intellectual property, Maria Pallante stated that the “law is showing the
12
See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, FEDERAL COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR PRE-1972 SOUND
RECORDINGS 28–41 (2011) (discussing various forms of state-law protection for pre-1972 recordings).
13
E.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 830 N.E.2d 250, 254–63 (N.Y. 2005).
14
Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 347–50 (1998); Grupo Mexicano
de Desarrollo S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318–21 (1999).
15
Golan v. Holder, 123 S. Ct. 873, 885–86, 900–02 (2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,
194, 196–97, 200–02, 230–33 (2003).
16
Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 315 (2013).
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strain of its age and requires your attention. . . . Congress should approach
the issues comprehensively over the next few years as part of a more
general revision of the statute.”17 The subcommittee has since held several
preliminary hearings on reform.18 And lest we forget, works will begin to
expire and fall into the public domain in 2019, for the first time since 1998,
unless Congress extends the copyright term again as it did in that year.19
Central to the upcoming debate will be the notion of property. For all
the complexities of copyright’s various rationales,20 property is perhaps the
easiest to understand and the one that resonates the most. Although the
concept is not absolute, and therefore copyright as property would not be
either,21 the rhetoric remains exceptionally strong. Neil Netanel explains:
Property rhetoric, whether invoked reflexively or strategically, has tended to support a vision of copyright as a
foundational entitlement, a broad “sole and despotic
dominion” over each and every possible use of a work rather
than a limited government grant narrowly tailored to serve a
public purpose.22
Bill Patry has similarly noted that “[o]nce something is deemed property, it
is irrelevant that an unauthorized use does not negatively impact the copyright owner, or even that the unauthorized use may be of great societal benefit. It is enough that property is involved and that it has been ‘taken.’”23
The potential consequences of labeling copyright as property are
many. Doing so suggests, for example, that Congress cannot take
17
The Register’s Call for Updates to U.S. Copyright Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (Mar. 20,
2013) (statement of Maria A. Pallante, Register of Copyrights).
18
E.g., Copyright Remedies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and
the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (July 24, 2014); Moral Rights, Termination
Rights, Resale Royalty, and Copyright Term: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual
Property, and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (July 15, 2014); Music
Licensing Under Title 17: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the
Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (June 10 & 25, 2014); First Sale Under Title
17: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (June 2, 2014); Section 512 of Title 17: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (Mar. 13,
2014); The Scope of Fair Use: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the
Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (Jan. 28, 2014); The Scope of Copyright
Protection: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (Jan. 14, 2014).
19
Joseph P. Liu, The New Public Domain, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1395, 1396, 1403–04.
20
See generally ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2011).
21
Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE
L.J. 1, 52–106 (2004); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51
OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 546–57 (1990).
22
NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 7 (2008).
23
WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS 103 (2009).
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copyrights without just compensation under the Fifth Amendment, that
final injunctions should always be granted, that formalities for copyright
should not be resurrected, and that copyrights should last forever. It can
also be used to resist expanding statutory compulsory licenses, or even for
scrapping current ones, and as a crutch for criminalizing more “thefts” of
copyrighted works. The notion that authors hold property rights derived
from their own labor additionally suggests that databases and other works
created with the “sweat of the brow” deserve protection.
As a consequence, academics and others have worked hard to embrace
or debunk, as the case may be, the idea of copyright as a property right.
And naturally, in arguing as much, they have inquired whether copyright
originally was a form of property, particularly as emanating from the common law or natural law.24 This is where the turn to English history occurs.
Scholars like Abrams, and a host of others who rely on his and
Deazley’s reexamination of Donaldson, argue that before the Copyright
Clause of the U.S. Constitution in 1787 and the Copyright Act of 1790,
England—the birthplace of Anglo-American copyright—had already
rejected the idea that copyright was a property right inherent in authors.
They then further argue that the Framers knew as much and thus had no
reason to believe that authors held antecedent rights.25 Copyright
maximalists, on the other hand, continue to rely on the orthodox origin of
copyright and argue that Framers like James Madison embraced it. They
insist that “from its inception[,] copyright was seen not merely as a matter
of legislative grace designed to incentivize productive activity, but as a
broader recognition of individuals’ inherent property right[s] in the fruits
of their own labor.”26 Statements like this and others have led copyright
skeptic Bill Patry to state, somewhat exasperatedly: “[D]espite [the]
rejection of copyright owners’ claims from the inception of copyright, they
have a psychological block in accepting reality.”27
The reality, however, is more complicated than many assume.

24
See generally Kathy Bowrey & Natalie Fowell, Digging Up Fragments and Building IP
Franchises, 31 SYDNEY L. REV. 185 (2009); Justin Hughes, Copyright and Incomplete Historiographies: Of Piracy, Propertization, and Thomas Jefferson, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 993 (2006); Adam
Mossoff, Is Copyright Property?, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 29 (2005). For a discussion of the interplay
between property and dignitary views of copyright in the 18th century, see Simon Stern, From Author’s
Right to Property Right, 62 U. TORONTO L.J. 29 (2012).
25
E.g., Abrams, supra note 5, at 1176–77; O’Melinn, supra note 11, at 92, 98–100, 116–20; Liam
Séamus O’Melinn, The Ghost of Millar v. Taylor 28–32 (Nov. 1, 2013) (unpublished manuscript).
26
PAUL CLEMENT ET AL., THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION 1 (2012); cf. Edward C. Walterscheid, Understanding the Copyright Act of 1790: The
Issue of Common Law Copyright in America and the Modern Interpretation of the Copyright Power, 53
J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 313, 318, 331–32 (2006) (discussing the 1790 Act).
27
PATRY, supra note 23, at 124; see also id. at 80, 99, 112 (discussing Donaldson).
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III. COMMON-LAW COPYRIGHT IN CONTEXT
Much has already been written about the history of British copyright
law before 1800.28 Those prior works obviate the need to reexamine the
subject, but a few words are necessary to help make sense of the issues
discussed here.
Before Great Britain enacted the first modern-like copyright statute in
1710—often called the Statute of Anne—a patchwork of regulatory instruments prohibited copyright infringement. This regulatory framework operated (with a few gaps) from 1566 until 1695, at which time the statute then
in effect, the Printing Act of 1662,29 permanently expired. None of these
regulations limited copyrights’ durations, so while regulated no work ever
fell out of protection and into the public domain, at least as we understand
that term today. After the demise of the 1662 Act, many publishers claimed
that the common law continued to protect their copyrights. By their lights,
authors and their assigns held perpetual property rights in their works; this
was, in their view, a right stemming from an author’s labor.30
A. Statute of Anne
Nevertheless, publishers still campaigned for a return to statutory
protection. Depending on who one believes, this occurred either because
they knew that in truth they held no common-law rights or because they
felt that their common-law rights, and the attendant remedies, were
inadequate and that statutory penalties and forfeitures were needed. In
response, Parliament enacted the Statute of Anne, which came into force
on April 10, 1710.31 The statute included penalties and forfeitures but its
terms were limited. It protected all books first published on or after April
10 for 14 years from first publication (and “no longer”), with a possible
reversion and additional term to the author of another 14 years if she was

28

Though not a comprehensive list, for England, see ISABELLA ALEXANDER, COPYRIGHT LAW
PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (2010); DEAZLEY, supra note 6; LYMAN
RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1968); MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT (1993); BRAD SHERMAN & LIONEL BENTLY, THE MAKING OF
MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (1999). For Scotland, see ALASTAIR J. MANN, THE SCOTTISH
BOOK TRADE, 1500–1720, at 95–191 (2000); Hector L. MacQueen, Intellectual Property and the Common Law in Scotland c1700–c1850, in THE COMMON LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 21 (Catherine
W. Ng et al. eds., 2010); Warren McDougall, Copyright and Scottishness, in 2 THE EDINBURGH
HISTORY OF THE BOOK IN SCOTLAND 23 (Stephen W. Brown & Warren McDougall eds., 2012).
29
Statute, 1662, 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 33.
30
E.g., THE CASE OF THE BOOKSELLERS RIGHT TO THEIR COPIES, OR SOLE POWER OF PRINTING
THEIR RESPECTIVE BOOKS, REPRESENTED TO THE PARLIAMENT (s.l.n. [c.1709]); REASONS HUMBLY
OFFER’D FOR THE BILL FOR ENCOURAGEMENT OF LEARNING (s.l.n. [c.1709/10]).
31
Statute, 1710, 8 Anne, c. 19, § 1. One part became effective March 25, 1710. Id. § 4.
AND THE
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32

still living at the expiration of the first term. A legacy clause protected
works published before the statute, but only for a period of 21 years from
its effective date, meaning through 1731.33 Less clear was whether
Parliament intended to preserve a preexisting form of common-law
copyright (if any such right existed). A savings clause in the statute stated:
[N]othing in this Act contained shall extend, or be construed
to extend, either to prejudice or confirm any Right that the
said Universities [of Cambridge or Oxford], or any of them,
or any Person or Persons have, or claim to have, to the
printing or reprinting any Book or Copy already printed, or
hereafter to be printed.34
Also unclear was whether the statute protected works before they were
first published. Although it prohibited the printing as well as reprinting of
new books, its remedies were available only during the “[t]imes granted
and limited” by the statute, meaning during the 14 years “commenc[ing]
from the Day of . . . first publishing the same.”35 Moreover, the remedies
were available only if the owner had registered the book before publication.36 Thus, any coverage for unpublished works had to be by implication.
It eventually fell to the courts of Great Britain to tackle three basic
questions: (1) Did a common-law copyright exist independent of the statute? (2) If so, did an author or her assigns lose that right once a work was
first published? Stated another way, did the authorized publication of a
work dedicate it to the public domain? (3) And lastly, if an author did not
lose the right upon publication, did the statute preempt the right or did the
statute simply augment the remedies for the limited times stated therein?
B. Millar v. Taylor
The first reported case to address these issues fully was Millar v.
Taylor,37 a dispute that played out in two venues. In 1763, Andrew Millar
sued Robert Taylor in the Court of Chancery for infringing a series of
poems called The Seasons, by James Thomson. Millar sought an injunction
and a disgorgement of Taylor’s profits; Taylor parried that the statutory
copyrights had expired.38 Sitting by designation, Baron Smythe of the
32
Id. §§ 1, 11. For the best treatment of this provision, see Lionel Bently & Jane C. Ginsburg,
“The Sole Right . . . Shall Return to the Authors”: Anglo-American Authors’ Reversion Rights from the
Statute of Anne to Contemporary U.S. Copyright, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1475, 1477–1549 (2010).
33
Statute, 1710, 8 Anne, c. 19, § 1.
34
Id. § 9.
35
Id. § 1 (emphasis added).
36
Id. § 2; see also Jane C. Ginsburg, “Une Chose Publique”? The Author’s Domain and the
Public Domain in Early British, French and US Copyright Law, 65 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 636, 645 (2006).
37
4 Burr. 2303 (K.B. 1769).
38
PRO C12/517/45, mm. 1–2 (Ch. 1763–1764).

2014]

COPYRIGHT AT COMMON LAW IN 1774

11

Court of Exchequer ordered the parties to state a case for the Court of
King’s Bench to determine whether Millar could hold a copyright.39
Smythe continued a previously granted injunction in the meantime,
signaling that he believed there was such a thing as a copyright at common
law—a view he later expressed in Donaldson v. Becket. But, in a turn of
events that offers a sneak peek at the battle to come in Donaldson, that
order was modified six months later by Lord Camden, who had recently
become Lord Chancellor. He ordered the injunction dissolved on Taylor’s
petition for rehearing, thus telegraphing his pessimistic view of the case.40
The case then moved to the King’s Bench where, in 1769,41 the court
endorsed a copyright based on property, natural justice, and reason. The
majority, which consisted of Chief Justice Mansfield and Justices Willes
and Aston, held that authors of literary compositions and their assigns had
a right at common law to control both the first publication and any
subsequent publications of their works.42 This right existed independent of
and beyond the terms of the Statute of Anne, which the court believed
merely augmented the remedies that were otherwise available for infringement at common law and in equity. Lord Mansfield and his colleagues had,
in effect, reversed Lord Camden. The lone dissenter was Justice Yates.
Although he concurred that authors had a right to control the first
publication of a work, so long as it was expressed in a manuscript,43 Yates
bristled at the idea that authors could control republication afterward. As
far as he was concerned, the statute created the right in published works.
After an aborted appeal to the Exchequer Chamber, the case returned
to the Chancery. Because the ruling declared that copyright in England was
perpetual, the Lords Commissioners perpetually enjoined Taylor and
ordered a master to assess the profits earned from infringement.44
IV. DONALDSON V. BECKET
It was not long before these issues were taken up again, this time by a
higher tribunal. First filed in the Court of Chancery in 1771, Donaldson v.
Becket was brought by Thomas Becket and others who claimed that they
had purchased the copyrights in The Seasons—the same work that was at
39

PRO C33/426, ff. 68v–69r (Ch. 1765).
PRO C28/8, ff. 84v–85r, C33/426, f. 325r (Ch. 1766).
41
PRO KB122/338, rot. 372 (K.B. Mich. 1766; judg. Pas. 1769, nunc pro tunc Trin. 1768).
42
Millar, 4 Burr. at 2312–14, 2334–35 (Willes, J.); id. at 2354 (Aston, J.); id. at 2395–99 (Lord
Mansfield, C.J.). Another account of the judges’ opinions in Millar, which differs in some respects,
may be found in SPEECHES OR ARGUMENTS OF THE JUDGES OF THE COURT OF KING’S BENCH (Leith,
W. Coke 1771). For an assessment of Lord Mansfield’s views in Millar by his legal biographer, see
JAMES OLDHAM, ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE AGE OF MANSFIELD 191–94 (2004).
43
Millar, 4 Burr. at 2355–56, 2378–79 (Yates, J., dissenting); accord Tonson v. Collins, 1 W.
Black. 321, 333, 338, BL Add. MS 36,201, ff. 53r, 69r–73r, 85r–86r (K.B. 1761) (Yates arg.).
44
PRO C33/433, ff. 413r–414r (Ch. 1770).
40
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issue in Millar. The defendants, Alexander and John Donaldson,
countered, as before, that the work was in the public domain.45 Relying on
Millar, the newly appointed Lord Chancellor, Lord Apsley, perpetually
enjoined the defendants and ordered them to disgorge any profits they had
earned.46 Not long after, the Donaldsons appealed to the House of Lords,47
which reversed, thus ending perpetual copyright in published works.

***
Because my disagreement with other scholars on the proper
interpretation of Donaldson turns crucially on the procedures of the House
of Lords and on the weight to give to certain records in the case, we must
turn our attention first to those procedures and records.
A. Procedure
An appeal48 from a decree of the Court of Chancery commenced when
a party filed a petition with the House of Lords. The House would read the
petition and order the respondent to put in an answer (usually pro forma).
Afterward, the House would appoint a day to hear the arguments of
counsel on both sides. By standing order, the House required each side to
submit printed “cases” four days in advance of the hearing.49 These were
not identical to the appellate briefs of today, but they did contain the background of the case and summaries of the “reasons” or arguments on either
side. Drafted by solicitors, and approved by the barristers who were to
argue the appeal, these briefs were simultaneously exchanged by counsel,
and a sufficient number, amounting to about 250 copies from each side,
would be provided to the Clerk of the Parliaments and to the Door-Keepers
of the House of Lords. The latter would then distribute them to the Lords.50
At the time of the appeal in Donaldson, the Upper House comprised
206 eligible Lords.51 Only three were “law Lords”—a term typically used
at the time to describe Lords who concurrently were, or had been, judges
45

Becket v. Donaldson, PRO C12/61/24, mm. 1–2 (Ch. 1771).
PRO C33/439, ff. 26r–27r (Ch. 1772).
47
Petition and Appeal, Donaldson v. Becket, PA HL/PO/JO/10/3/263/50 (Dec. 10, 1772).
48
Proceedings on writs of error differed in some respects, but are not separately treated here.
49
Standing Orders, 22 H.L. JOUR. 374, 381 (Dec. 18, 1724 & Jan. 12, 1724/5); 30 id. at 485 (Feb.
28, 1764).
50
JOHN IMPEY, THE NEW INSTRUCTOR CLERICALIS 622 (London, Majesty’s Law Printers 4th ed.
1788); GEORGE URQUHART, THE EXPERIENCED SOLICITOR, IN PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE APPELLANT
JURISDICTION OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE HOUSE OF LORDS ON APPEALS AND WRITS OF ERROR
59–68 (London, W. Strahan & M. Woodfall 1773); see also 22 H.L. JOUR. 628 (Mar. 22, 1726/7) (table
of tasks and fees). For an example of the steps a solicitor took during an actual appeal to the Lords,
along with the associated costs, see Pearson & Loggen Solicitors, Bill Book, 1797 to 1802, LMA
CLC/B/136/MS18744/013, pp. 126–29 (describing tasks and fees in Cave v. Otway, 1798–1799).
51
M.W. MCCAHILL, THE HOUSE OF LORDS IN THE AGE OF GEORGE III 99 (2009).
46
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on one of the superior courts of England. Because the remaining “lay
Lords” had little or no legal training, the House had the option of seeking
legal assistance from some or all of the judges of the common law courts
of England—usually four apiece from the courts of King’s Bench,
Common Pleas, and Exchequer. This was not always done, and the House
often decided appeals on its own. If the Lords sought assistance, they
would exercise it by asking the judges one or more questions. The judges
would then confer and respond on the spot or at a future date after further
consultation. If the judges differed in their views, they would present their
answers and underlying reasons seriatim. If they were unanimous, a single
judge would typically speak for them all.52 The House could accept or
reject the views of the majority of the judges, but rejections were
exceedingly rare.53 In Donaldson, as we will soon see, eleven judges
answered five questions each, and they were not unanimous.
After the judges said their piece it would be left to one of the Lords to
move to affirm or reverse whatever decree was on appeal. The House
would then debate the matter. The number of Lords present during a debate
could differ greatly depending on the time of the year, interest in the case,
and interest in other items on the agenda. Attendance on the day also did
not guarantee attention or participation.54 In any event, it was usual and
expected that one or more Lords would present speeches in an effort to
persuade their colleagues to vote one way or the other.55 Typically, the
Lord Chancellor56 and other law Lords would lead the way, but the
remaining members were not obligated to agree with them. Thus, James
Boswell, an author and counsel in copyright cases, noted in 1778:
[A]ll the Peers [i.e., the Lords] are vested with the highest
judicial powers; and, when they are confident that they
52
In these uncontroversial cases, the judge sometimes answered the question or questions without
providing any underlying reasoning. E.g., Troward v. Calland (H.L. 1796) (MacDonald, C.B.), in
JAMES OLDHAM, CASE NOTES OF SIR SOULDEN LAWRENCE 1787–1800, at 111, 118 (2013).
53
See infra text accompanying notes 185–188.
54
In an appeal in 1703, for example, only 13 of 57 Lords voted. Powell v. Pleydell, 17 H.L. JOUR.
242 (H.L. 1702/3); THE LONDON DIARIES OF WILLIAM NICOLSON, BISHOP OF CARLISLE 1702–1718, at
173 (Clyve Jones & Geoffrey Holmes eds., 1985) (Jan. 15, 1702/3). In another appeal in 1721, 32 of 71
Lords voted. Paterson v. Commissioners, 21 H.L. JOUR. 479, Rob. 349, 354 (H.L. 1720/1). And on a
writ of error in 1778, 24 of 56 Lords voted. Horne v. Rex, 35 H.L. JOUR. 476 (H.L. 1778); GENERAL
EVENING POST (London), May 12, 1778, at 4. On the quirks and reliability of attendance lists, see
Clyve Jones, Seating Problems in the House of Lords in the Early Eighteenth Century: The Evidence of
the Manuscript Minutes, 51 BULL. INST. HIST. RES. 132, 139–43 (1978). Appearing on the attendance
list indicated only that the Lord was present and noticed at the time the clerk compiled the list.
55
When proposing to affirm, however, speaking Lords often refrained from articulating the
reasons for doing so. E.g., Coltart v. Maxwell, 2 Pat. App. 482, 486 (H.L. 1779); accord Davidson v.
Fleming, 4 Pat. App. 554, 559 (H.L. 1804); Graham v. Weir, 4 Pat. App. 548, 554 (H.L. 1804).
56
On the Lord Chancellor’s role in the House of Lords, see Ruth Paley, The Speakership of the
House of Lords, 1660–1832, in SPEAKERS AND THE SPEAKERSHIP 102 (Paul Seward ed., 2010).
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understand a cause, are not obliged, nay ought not to
acquiesce in the opinion of the ordinary law Judges, or even
in that of those who from their studies and experience are
called the Law Lords. I consider the Peers in general as I do a
Jury, who ought to listen with respectful attention to the
sages of the law; but, if after hearing them, they have a firm
opinion of their own, are bound, as honest men, to decide
accordingly.57
As we will see shortly, two law Lords and three lay Lords spoke in
Donaldson.
After the debate, the Speaker of the House (a position usually taken up
by the Lord Chancellor) would formally put the question as one to reverse
so as to ensure that if there was a tie in the votes the lower court’s decree
or judgment would stand.58 The House would then vote by either a
collective voice vote or a division59 and then enter judgment accordingly.
There seems to have been a norm, at least among the law Lords, to not vote
if the law Lord was not present to hear all the arguments of counsel.60
Thus, procedurally, there were eight principal components of an
appeal: (1) the initiating petition; (2) the printed cases of counsel; (3) the
oral arguments of counsel; (4) the answers of the judges to any questions;
(5) the reasons or opinions of the judges supporting their answers; (6) the
debate of the Lords in attendance, which included the speeches of the
Lords who chose to speak; and (7) the vote and (8) judgment of the House.
Throughout this Article, I use the italicized words as terms of art.
B. Records
Apart from the printed cases and other documents noted previously,
appeals could generate further records. Of these, the only official memorial
was the journal of the House of Lords. In the late 18th century, journal
entries began as scrap notes taken by the Clerk Assistant or one of his
deputies, which were then transferred to a minute book.61 The Clerk of the
57
2 JAMES BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON, LL.D. 261 (London, C. Dilly 1791)
(recalling a conversation from May 12, 1778 with Samuel Johnson). For Boswell’s account of his first
argument as counsel in an appeal in the House of Lords in 1772, see BOSWELL FOR THE DEFENCE
1769–1774, at 62, 112–17, 125 (William K. Wimsatt, Jr. & Frederick A. Pottle eds., 1959) (1772).
58
Standing Order, 14 H.L. JOUR. 677 (Dec. 7, 1691).
59
MCCAHILL, supra note 51, at 107.
60
See Chaplin v. Bree (H.L. 1775) (Lord Camden) (“[I] should never be the first that would
introduce so fatal a precedent, should it ever come to be adopted, as giving a vote without personally
attending from the beginning to the end.”), in GAZETTEER (London), Mar. 10, 1775, at 2. As for the lay
Lords, I know of at least one case where some appeared to vote despite missing some of the arguments.
Pomfret v. Smith, 33 H.L. JOUR. 94 (H.L. 1771); LONDON EVENING-POST, Mar. 9, 1771, at 4.
61
MAURICE F. BOND, GUIDE TO THE RECORDS OF PARLIAMENT 26–27, 33 (1971); J.C. SAINTY &
D. DEWAR, DIVISIONS IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS: AN ANALYTICAL LIST 1685 TO 1857, at 3 (1976); see
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Journals would later move the minutes to a manuscript journal, which
became the official record of the proceedings. Neither the minute book nor
the journal recorded everything that was said. On the contrary, they usually
recorded only what was done. During judicial business, this meant
recording procedural maneuvers and noting when and which counsel were
speaking. If the judges had been summoned, the journal would often note
who had spoken and when, and their answers to any questions presented.
The recorded answers were usually brief—no more than a sentence or
two—because they typically contain no reasoning. Take, for example, the
following question and answer from Donaldson:
1. “Whether, at Common Law, an Author of any Book or
“Literary Composition, had the Sole Right of first printing
“and publishing the same for Sale, and might bring an Action
“against any Person who printed, published, and sold the
“same, without his Consent? . . . .”
....
Mr. Baron Eyre was heard upon the said Questions; and,
1. Upon the First Question delivered his Opinion,
“That, at Common Law, an Author of any Book or Literary
“Composition had not the sole Right of first printing and
“publishing the same for Sale, and could not bring an Action
“against any Person who printed, published, and sold the
“same, without his Consent:”
And gave his Reasons.62
Additionally, neither the journal nor the minute book recorded any
aspect of the debates among the Lords, not even which Lords had spoken.
Ultimately, the journal recorded the judgment, which could vary in its
length and complexity. Often it was very short, stating only that the case
was reversed or affirmed.
Other records might be available—such as reports of what lawyers,
judges, and Lords actually said—but they were unofficial and scarce. The
absence of regular reporting stemmed largely from the fact that publishing
the proceedings of the House of Lords violated parliamentary privilege.
Both the House of Commons and the House of Lords claimed to hold in
their corporate capacities a right to control the publication of their votes,
speeches, debates, and proceedings. Violating the privilege was considered
also BL Add. MS 35,878, f. 261r (c.1753) (“The Clerk Assistant by his Deputation . . . takes Minutes,
and keeps and Methodizes the proceedings and Records.”); cf. THE MANUSCRIPTS OF THE HOUSE OF
LORDS, 1714–1718, at xvii–xxiii (David J. Johnson ed., 1977) (describing an earlier period).
62
Donaldson v. Becket, 34 H.L. JOUR. 21, 24 (H.L. 1774).
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contemptuous and could lead to censure, arrest, a fine, or destruction of the
offending works.63 One of the more high-profile reprimands occurred in
1699 when the Lords censured John Churchill, a bookseller, for publishing
cases adjudged in the House of Lords.64 Another occurred in 1771, when
the Lords fined and imprisoned William Woodfall, a newspaper publisher,
because his paper had published parts of the appeal in Pomfret v. Smith.65
Despite these prohibitions, by 1774 journalists had become bolder in
their reporting of parliamentary proceedings.66 Although doing so was still
a breach of privilege, both Houses of Parliament were becoming more
tolerant of the practice. Jason Peacey notes, however, that “reporting was
far from assured, let alone officially welcomed or supported.”67 There was,
for example, no place for reporters to sit in the House of Lords—they
would have to stand below the Bar of the House, if there was room—and
the taking of notes was prohibited.68
Donaldson overcame these obstacles, and a number of unofficial
accounts reached the public. Many of these sources are known to modern
scholars, but some are not. And, of those that are known, their duplicative
nature has not always been appreciated. Consequently, scholars sometimes
treat them as if they were each independently reported by different persons
who were present at the appeal. These various sources are then cited in
combination to serve as corroboration for a particular point. In truth, however, on the issues most pertinent for our purposes, nearly all of the principal accounts derive from one of only two sources: the manuscript journal
of the House of Lords and a newspaper account in the Morning Chronicle.
What follows below are the principal accounts, roughly in order of
publication. Most are narratives of the proceedings, but a few are not
(numbers 9, 10, and 12). A more detailed breakdown of these sources and
numerous others can be found infra in the Appendix.

63
H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, The Untold Story of the First Copyright Suit Under the Statute of
Anne in 1710, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1247, 1252–53 (2010).
64
16 H.L. JOUR. 389, 391 (Feb. 24 & 27, 1698/9).
65
33 id. at 113–14 (Mar. 14, 1771); see also Pomfret v. Smith, 6 Bro. P.C. 434 (H.L. 1771).
66
G.M. Ditchfield, The House of Lords in the Age of the American Revolution, in A PILLAR OF
THE CONSTITUTION: THE HOUSE OF LORDS IN BRITISH POLITICS, 1640–1784, at 199, 204–09 (Clyve
Jones ed., 1989); William C. Lowe, Peers and Printers: The Beginnings of Sustained Press Coverage
of the House of Lords in the 1770s, 7 PARL. HIST. 241, 248–52 (1988); Peter D.G. Thomas, The Beginning of Parliamentary Reporting in Newspapers, 1768–1774, 74 ENG. HIST. REV. 623, 627–28 (1959).
67
Jason Peacey, The Print Culture of Parliament, 1600–1800, in THE PRINT CULTURE OF
PARLIAMENT, 1600–1800, at 1, 9 (Jason Peacey ed., 2007).
68
MICHAEL MACDONAGH, THE REPORTERS’ GALLERY 287 (1913). For the layout of the House
of Lords in the late 18th century, along with its location relative to the rest of the Palace of
Westminster, see HONOUR, INTEREST & POWER: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS,
1660–1715, at 203 (Ruth Paley et al. eds., 2010); DORIAN GERHOLD, WESTMINSTER HALL: NINE
HUNDRED YEARS OF HISTORY 50 (1999).
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1. Morning Chronicle—February 5 to 26, 1774. William Woodfall, the
editor and publisher of this daily London newspaper, stood below the
Bar of the House of Lords each day and memorized as much of the
proceedings as he was able. Over the course of several issues, he
recounted the arguments of counsel, opinions of the judges, and
speeches of the Lords.
2. London Chronicle—February 5 to March 5, 1774.70 Correspondents
from this thrice-weekly paper attended or otherwise obtained reports of
a few arguments and two opinions. Its reports of the other arguments,
opinions, and speeches stem from the Morning Chronicle.
3. Middlesex Journal—February 5 to 24, 1774.71 This newspaper offered
original accounts of all the counsels’ arguments, but the opinions are
taken from the Morning Chronicle and one other paper. It also reported
very short but apparently original accounts of the speeches.
4. Caledonian Mercury and Edinburgh Advertiser—February 9 to March
9, 1774.72 These Scottish newspapers contain original accounts of
some of the arguments, opinions, and speeches. Others stem from the
Morning Chronicle, London Chronicle, and one other newspaper.
5. Sentimental Magazine and Town and Country Magazine—both early
March 1774.73 Donaldson first appeared in a consolidated form in the
February issues of these two magazines. These largely drew their texts
from the Morning Chronicle and a few other papers, but the Town and
Country contains a brief note of one opinion that seems original.
6. Gentleman’s Magazine—early March, April, and May 1774.74 This
magazine spread an account across its February, March, and April
issues. It mostly copies the Morning Chronicle and London Chronicle,
but it also contains two original paragraphs from one judge’s opinion.

69

MORNING CHRONICLE (London), Feb. 5–26, 1774.
LONDON CHRONICLE, Feb. 5–Mar. 5, 1774.
71
MIDDLESEX JOURNAL (London), Feb. 5–24, 1774.
72
CALEDONIAN MERCURY (Edinburgh), Feb. 9–Mar. 9, 1774; EDINBURGH ADVERTISER, Feb.
11–Mar. 1, 1774.
73
2 SENTIMENTAL MAGAZINE 81 (London, G. Kearsley 1774) (Feb. issue); 6 TOWN AND
COUNTRY MAGAZINE 97, 110 (London, A. Hamilton Jr. 1774) (Feb. issue); see also MORNING
CHRONICLE (London), Mar. 1, 1774, at 1 (advertisements announcing publication of both magazines).
74
44 GENTLEMAN’S MAGAZINE 51, 99, 147 (London, D. Henry 1774) (Feb., Mar., & Apr. issues).
For publication advertisements, see LONDON EVENING-POST, Mar. 1, 1774, at 2 (Feb. issue); id. Apr. 2,
1774, at 2 (Mar. issue); MORNING CHRONICLE (London), May 2, 1774, at 1 (Apr. issue).
70
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7. Pleadings Account—early March 1774. This stand-alone account, the
first dedicated entirely to Donaldson, spans 39 pages. It mostly draws
its material from the Morning Chronicle, London Chronicle, Middlesex
Journal, and Gentleman’s Magazine. But it also contains some original
reporting of one of the arguments of counsel.
8. Cases Account—early May 1774.76 This second stand-alone account
spans 68 pages. It purportedly contains the “genuine” printed cases,
arguments, opinions, and speeches. The compiler added credence to
this boast by indicating that he drew his account from his own notes of
the proceedings.77 This is false. Apart from some paraphrasing, which
mostly recasts the account from third to first person, and the adding of
some references and documents, this narrative comes from the
Pleadings Account. Additionally, it sometimes deduces and fabricates
the answers of the judges, to the questions posed, from the opinions as
they appear in the Pleadings Account.78
A literary magazine reviewed the Pleadings and Cases Accounts
several months after their publication and criticized them as having
been compiled by “blundering editors.”79 The reviewer wrote:
[B]oth [books] pretend to give the Public the genuine
arguments of the Counsel, opinions of the Judges, and
speeches of the Lords . . . but the former bears evident
marks of having been compiled by some illiterate hand from
news paper memorials; and the latter retracts in the preface
the promises [of genuineness] . . . .80
9. Burrow Report—1776.81 Donaldson next appeared in a collection of
traditional law reports, when James Burrow published a synopsis of it
at the end of his report of Millar v. Taylor. This report does not contain
the arguments, opinions, or speeches. Rather, it primarily prints the

75
THE PLEADINGS OF THE COUNSEL BEFORE THE HOUSE OF LORDS, IN THE GREAT CAUSE
CONCERNING LITERARY PROPERTY (London, C. Wilkin et al. [1774]); see also LONDON EVENINGPOST, Mar. 8, 1774, at 2 (advertisement).
76
THE CASES OF THE APPELLANTS AND RESPONDENTS IN THE CAUSE OF LITERARY PROPERTY
(London, J. Bew et al. 1774); see also LONDON CHRONICLE, Apr. 30, 1774, at 415 (advertisement).
77
CASES, supra note 76, sig. a2v.
78
Notably, one of the publishers listed on the imprint of the Cases Account, “C. Wilkin,” also
appears on the imprint of the Pleadings Account. I should also note that some of the compiler’s preface
was plagiarized from elsewhere. Compare id. sig. a1r, a2v–a3r, with [JAMES BURROW], THE QUESTION
CONCERNING LITERARY PROPERTY 2 (London, W. Strahan & M. Woodfall 1773), and 1 JAMES BURROW, REPORTS OF CASES ADJUDGED IN THE COURT OF KING’S BENCH viii (London, J. Worrall 1766).
79
51 MONTHLY REVIEW; OR, LITERARY JOURNAL 202, 209 (London, R. Griffiths 1774).
80
Id.
81
Donaldson v. Becket, 4 Burr. 2408 (H.L. 1774).
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manuscript journal of the House of Lords, that is to say, the answers of
the judges alone, and the two are identical in all pertinent respects.
10. Brown Report—1783.82 Josiah Brown next reported Donaldson as part
of his multi-volume collection of parliamentary cases. Although his
report appears to be of the oral arguments, it is not. He simply took the
printed cases and recast them to appear as an actual argument. Brown
also included the names of the judges who opined in favor of perpetual
copyright, which he expressly took from the manuscript journal.83
11. Debrett Account—1792.84 In 1792, John Debrett reprinted in his
collection of parliamentary debates the speeches that appeared in the
Middlesex Journal. Additionally, Debrett was the first to report the
names and numbers of the Lords who supposedly voted for and against
reversing the decree, but his report of the division was erroneous.85
12. Printed Journal—c.1806.86 Burdened by a lengthy backlog, the House
of Lords did not print its manuscript journal for 1774 until c.1806.
13. Cobbett Account—1813.87 The last published account contains no
original material and stems entirely from the Morning Chronicle,
London Chronicle, Debrett Account, and Printed Journal. It also
sometimes combines the accounts in ways that are contradictory.
Despite searching extensively in various libraries and Inns of Court, I
have been unable to find any manuscript law reports of the proceedings.
C. Appeal
Let us return now to the appeal itself. The House of Lords heard oral
arguments in Donaldson over the course of four days in early February.88
Afterward, the House asked the twelve judges, who had attended the
preceding arguments, to offer their views on five questions, the first three
of which were essentially as follows:

82

Donaldson v. Becket, 7 Bro. P.C. 88 (H.L. 1774).
Id. at 110; see also 1 id. at ii–iii (describing his methods). Remarkably, Brown had served as
defense counsel for the Donaldsons in the Court of Chancery in Donaldson and in a number of other
similar suits. See, e.g., Becket v. Donaldson, PRO C12/64/24, m. 2 (Ch. 1771); Rivington v. Donaldson, PRO C12/1323/15, m. 2 (Ch. 1771); Whiston v. Donaldson, PRO C12/64/26, m. 2 (Ch. 1771).
84
7 THE HISTORY, DEBATES, AND PROCEEDINGS OF BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT OF GREAT
BRITAIN 2–4 (London, J. Debrett 1792).
85
See infra note 108 for an explanation of the error.
86
34 H.L. JOUR. 18–21, 23–24, 26–30, 32 (Feb. 4–22, 1774) (printed c.1806).
87
17 [WILLIAM COBBETT], THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE EARLIEST
PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1803, at col. 953 (London, T.C. Hansard et al. 1813).
88
34 H.L. JOUR. 18–21 (Feb. 4, 7–9, 1774).
83
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1. Did an author have a right at common law to prevent an unauthorized
first publication of a book or literary composition?
2. If so, did an author lose that right upon first publication, or could she
continue to control further publication of such a work?
3. If a right at common law existed, or hypothetically existed, did the
Statute of Anne take it away or abridge it?
The third question is the most ambiguous. Given the principal issue
that was at stake in Donaldson, it necessarily queries whether the statute
preempts any common-law copyright that exists in a work once it is published. But it is less clear whether it also asked if the statute preempted any
common-law protections that existed before a work was first published.
Two other questions, which I have not reproduced, restated the first
three in a slightly different form.89 The five questions were memorialized
in writing and put to the judges.90 After conferring among themselves,91 the
judges returned six days later and began to deliver their responses in order
of ascending seniority. It took three days, spread over the course of a week.
A chronology of the opinions (and other items) can be found in the
Appendix. All the judges, save one, offered their views. Lord Mansfield of
the Court of King’s Bench, who also sat as a peer in the House of Lords,
did not speak as a judge or law Lord. It is often said that he recused
himself because he would effectively be defending his judgment in Millar
v. Taylor.92 But there must have been more to this given that there was no
requirement that he disqualify himself in this instance.93 Indeed, many
observers lamented that he chose not to speak,94 and one legislator, George
Onslow, later suggested that a law be passed to “compel every judge to
give his opinion.”95 Perhaps Mansfield simply did not wish on this
occasion to engage in an oratory battle with his nemesis Lord Camden.96
89
The fourth question combined questions one and two, and the fifth rephrased the third. For the
actual questions, see Donaldson v. Becket, 4 Burr. 2408 (H.L. 1774).
90
PA HL/PO/JO/10/7/373, ff. 310r, 311r (Feb. 9, 1774); 34 H.L. JOUR. 21 (Feb. 9, 1774).
91
MIDDLESEX JOURNAL (London), Feb. 15, 1774, at 3 (“Friday there was a meeting of all the
Judges at Lord Chief Justice De Grey’s, and on Sunday night another at Lord Mansfield’s, to take the
arguments of the Counsel into consideration.”).
92
Donaldson, 4 Burr. at 2417.
93
Cf., e.g., Bishop of London v. Ffytche (H.L. 1783) (Earl of Mansfield) (speaking as a law Lord
in the House of Lords in defense of an opinion he had given in the case below), in TIMOTHY
CUNNINGHAM, THE LAW OF SIMONY 52, 167–74 (London, Majesty’s Law-Printers 1784).
94
E.g., 2 WESTMINSTER MAGAZINE 63–64 (London, W. Goldsmith 1774) (Feb. issue); WEEKLY
MAGAZINE (Edinburgh), Apr. 14, 1774, at 77.
95
Henry Cavendish, Debates in the Commons, BL Add. MS 64,869, f. 149r (Apr. 22, 1774)
(transcription of shorthand notes from BL Egerton MS 255, p. 235).
96
ROSE, supra note 28, at 99–101. For contemporaneous remarks on his silence, see Letter from
the Earl of Shelburne to the Earl of Chatham (Feb. 27, 1774), in 4 CORRESPONDENCE OF WILLIAM
PITT, EARL OF CHATHAM 326, 327–28 (William S. Taylor & John H. Pringle eds., London, J. Murray
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To state at large the positions of all eleven judges on all the questions
would be repetitious and tedious, not to mention superfluous for our
purposes. Suffice it to say that the tally from the journal on the three
questions indicates that the judges opined, 8 to 3, for a common-law right
before first publication; 7 to 4, for a common-law right after first publication; and 6 to 5, that the statute took away any common-law right.97 The
seven judges who opined for a common-law copyright in published works
were Justices Nares, Ashurst, Blackstone, Willes, Aston, and Gould, along
with Baron Smythe. But the clerk of the House recorded two of them—
Justices Nares and Gould—as also stating that the right was preempted.
That meant that when combined with the judges who were against the right
ab initio, a majority of the judges had effectively recommended reversal.
The day after the last judge said his piece, Lord Camden moved to
reverse the decree. The motion being opposed, it was left to the Lords to
debate the matter. Five Lords spoke before they voted. Two were law
Lords: Lord Camden, who had previously served as Chief Justice of the
Common Pleas (1762–1766) and then as Lord Chancellor (1766–1770),
and Lord Apsley, the then-current Lord Chancellor and the person who had
presided over the case in the Court of Chancery. Given the attention that
scholars of Donaldson have rightly paid to the speeches of the Lords, and
our disagreement over the weight to give to those speeches, I must say a bit
more about the views of the Lords who spoke. Unfortunately, many of the
printed speeches are woefully incomplete, so it is impossible to offer
absolutes about what a Lord said or, even more so, did not say.
Lord Camden spoke most forcefully against the common-law right,
opining that such a right had never existed and that the Statute of Anne
created copyright in both unpublished and published works.98 He also
argued in the alternative that the statute “took away any right at Common
Law for an author’s exclusively multiplying copies if any such right
existed.”99 Lord Apsley spoke next and certainly concurred with respect to
published works, stating, as he later recalled, that “he was satisfied there
never did exist a common law right.”100 But there is nothing in the short
reports of his speech from which to infer whether he was for or against an

1840); Letter from Lord Townshend to J.H. Hutchinson (Feb. 25, 1774), in THE MANUSCRIPTS OF THE
DUKE OF BEAUFORT, K.G., THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE, AND OTHERS 277–78 (London, HMSO
1891); Letter from H. Wilmot to the Earl of Denbigh (Feb. 22, 1774), WCRO CR2017/C243, p. 396.
97
34 H.L. JOUR. 23–24, 26–30 (Feb. 15–21, 1774). Although he did not speak, the views of Lord
Mansfield were readily available from his published opinion in Millar. So were the dissenting views of
the then-deceased Justice Yates. Numerically, they largely canceled each other out.
98
MORNING CHRONICLE (London), Feb. 24, 1774, at 2; id. Feb. 25, 1774, at 2.
99
Id. Feb. 23, 1774, at 3.
100
LONDON CHRONICLE, June 4, 1774, at 534.

22

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:1

antecedent incorporeal right in unpublished works. It is also unclear
whether Lord Apsley spoke on the issue of preemption.101
The views of the lay Lords were mixed. Lord Lyttelton, for one, was in
favor of a common-law right in unpublished and published works that
persisted independent of the statute.102 He thus urged his colleagues to
affirm the decree. The Bishop of Carlisle spoke next and stated that he did
not want to linger on whether there was, previous to the Statute of Anne, a
common-law right of one sort or the other. Indeed, he was “desirous of
having all such [arguments] waved.”103 The Bishop instead urged the Lords
to deliberate on the question of preemption:
[I desire that] your Lordships deliberation [be] reduced to the
present state of that Right under the direction of our
legislature, which has made, or at least attempted to make,
certain express regulations in it; more particularly [the
Statute of Anne], which [under] . . . a fair stating and
unforc’d construction of it, I apprehend to be sufficient for
deciding the whole controversy.104
He could not resist stating that he had little faith in an antecedent right.
Nevertheless, such a “right, whatever it were supposed to be originally, is
now plainly circumscribed and subjected to certain restrictions.”105
The report of the last peer to speak, the Earl of Effingham, is largely
barren. Although he rejected perpetual copyright, it is unclear whether he
believed there was no copyright before the Statute of Anne, the statute
preempted any such right, or both (or none) of the above. The reports
indicate only that he limited his address to a principle of policy, namely,
that copyright could impinge on the liberty of the press because it might
prevent the publication of matters that were critical of the government.106
101
E.g., MORNING CHRONICLE (London), Feb. 26, 1774, at 2. Lord Apsley’s rulings in subsequent cases are inconclusive on whether he believed in a common-law copyright in unpublished works.
In a suit decided a month after Donaldson, Lord Apsley enjoined a defendant from printing an
unpublished work until the hearing without the reports mentioning the statute. Thompson v. Stanhope,
LI Hill MS 14, p. 41, Amb. 737, 739–40 (Ch. 1774). This might suggest he relied upon a copyright at
common law or (more likely) that the reporters failed to record any mention of the statute. Four years
later, while granting an injunction until answer in another case, Lord Apsley did cite the statute, stating
that “as long as [works] continued to remain in manuscript, they were protected by the act of Parliament.” Coleman v. Wheble (Ch. 1778), in MORNING CHRONICLE (London), Feb. 4, 1778, at 2; see
also Coleman v. Wheble, PRO C33/449, f. 186r–v (Ch. 1778). This too is inconclusive, however, as he
might simply have concluded that the statute preempted a preexisting copyright in unpublished works.
102
MORNING CHRONICLE (London), Feb. 26, 1774, at 2.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 3. The Bishop had previously expressed his views on the subject and argued against a
common-law right in published works. [EDMUND LAW (BISHOP OF CARLISLE)], OBSERVATIONS
OCCASIONED BY THE CONTEST ABOUT LITERARY PROPERTY 14–15 (Cambridge, T. & J. Merrill 1770).
106
MORNING CHRONICLE (London), Feb. 26, 1774, at 3.
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Lastly, we also know the views of the Bishop of St. Asaph, even
though he did not utter a speech. He believed there never was a commonlaw right and that recognizing as much would disadvantage the public.107
At the close of the debate, the House voted to reverse the decree by
taking a collective voice vote.108 Unfortunately, the 84 Lords listed as in
attendance that day were not asked to answer the same questions as the
judges.109 As a result, the outcome was clear, but the reasoning supporting
it was not. Reversal of the decree meant that thenceforth copyrights in
published works were governed by the Statute of Anne and its limited
durations. Yet, was it because copyright had never existed at common law
or because it no longer existed due to statutory preemption? Moreover,
given that the statute did not expressly protect works while they remained
unpublished, did a common-law copyright protect those works? Did the
statute implicitly protect them? Or did works have to be published (and
thereby fall under the statute) in order to receive protection?
D. Perceptions
Not surprisingly, Donaldson engendered confusion. I leave for Part V
a more detailed discussion of how advocates and judges interpreted the
decision. Here, it suffices to summarize, as a spectrum, the differing views
of commentators. (1) On one end, some observers described Donaldson as
having rejected both types of antecedent common-law rights.110 Others
107
2 JONATHAN SHIPLEY, THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT REVEREND JONATHAN SHIPLEY, D.D. LORD
BISHOP OF ST. ASAPH 201 (London, T. Cadell 1792) (seeming to limit his view to published works).
108
34 H.L. JOUR. 32 (Feb. 22, 1774). It is often said by scholars who rely on the Cobbett Account
that the vote to reverse was 22 to 11. E.g., Abrams, supra note 5, at 1158, 1164 (citing 17 COBBETT,
supra note 87, at col. 1003). This is incorrect on two counts. First, the division Cobbett reported was 21
to 11; scholars have accidentally treated the Bishop of Litchfield and Coventry as two persons. Second,
the source that Cobbett relied upon, Debrett, confused the vote in Donaldson with a vote on a
subsequent bill to extend the statutory term for certain works. The names of the persons Debrett
reported as being for or against the decree, see 7 HISTORY, supra note 84, at 4, were actually those who
were for or against proceeding with the bill, see 34 H.L. JOUR. 232 (June 2, 1774) (rejecting the bill by
employing a procedural stratagem); MS Minutes of the House of Lords, PA HL/PO/JO/5/1/121 (June 2,
1774) (recording the division as 21 to 11); EDINBURGH ADVERTISER, June 7, 1774, at 357 (listing the
32 Lords who voted); accord William C. Lowe, Politics in the House of Lords, 1760–1775, at 853 n.55
(1975) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Emory University). In truth, as Rose correctly suspected, the
vote in Donaldson occurred without a division. ROSE, supra note 28, at 102. This means that the Lords
were not asked to physically divide to make their numbers more transparent than in a collective voice
vote. Thus, contrary to what Debrett has led us to believe for over 200 years, we do not know the
number of Lords who voted, their names, or how they each voted. The only insight we have on the
collective voice vote, apart from the outcome, is a newspaper report stating that “[n]othing was heard
but the word CONTENT.” EDINBURGH ADVERTISER, Mar. 1, 1774, at 132, cited in ROSE, supra note
28, at 102. Assuming this to be true, it does not mean that every Lord voted to reverse. Rather, it seems
more likely that those inclined to affirm remained silent after hearing that theirs was a lost cause.
109
34 H.L. JOUR. 32 (Feb. 22, 1774).
110
E.g., 2 RICHARD WOODDESON, A SYSTEMATICAL VIEW OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 393–94
(London, T. Payne 1792); cf. WILLIAM KENRICK, AN ADDRESS TO THE ARTISTS AND MANUFAC-
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thought it rejected only a common-law right in published works. (2) In
the middle were those who followed the lead of Justice Blackstone in his
Commentaries on the Laws of England. He stated the holding narrowly:
once a work was published it was governed solely by the durational terms
of the Statute of Anne.112 (3) Another approach, which was consistent with
the approach taken by Justice Blackstone, was to acknowledge implicitly
that the reasoning of the House was indiscernible and to then rely on the
opinions or answers of the judges, the speeches of the Lords, the opinions
in Millar, or some combination thereof to describe the law on antecedent
rights. Consider the following summary:
[T]he decision in [Millar] . . . was overturned by this decision
of the majority of the twelve Judges, and the law settled as
follows. That an author had at common law a property in his
work, and the sole right of printing and publishing the same,
and that when printed or published, the law did not take this
right away, but that by the statute 8th Ann, an author has no
copy-right, after the expiration of the several terms created
thereby.113
Notably, these early observations did not state that the House of Lords, as a
body, had adjudged that there was an antecedent common-law right.
Lastly, a fourth (4) posture on the other end of the spectrum emerged:
namely, that the House did affirmatively hold that there was an antecedent
copyright at common law, based in property, but that it was preempted.114
Deazley has demonstrated that the third and fourth readings have
percolated through the cases and literature and come to predominate over

GREAT BRITAIN 64–68 (London, Domville et al. 1774) (semble); but see 51 MONTHLY
REVIEW, supra note 79, at 276, 280–81 (criticizing Kenrick as misconstruing the law after Donaldson).
111
E.g., 1 WILLIAM THOMAS AYRES, A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE
ENGLISH AND IRISH STATUTE AND COMMON LAW 315–18 & n.b (London, E. Brooke 1780).
112
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 407 & n.h (Oxford,
Clarendon Press 7th ed. 1775); see also, e.g., 5 MATTHEW BACON & HENRY GWILLIM, A NEW
ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 601 (London, A. Strahan 5th ed. 1798); 1 RICHARD BURN & JOHN BURN, A
NEW LAW DICTIONARY 122 (London, A. Strahan & W. Woodfall 1792); 5 JOHN COMYNS, A DIGEST
OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 570 (London, W. Strahan & M. Woodfall 1780).
113
2 LEGAL RECREATIONS, OR POPULAR AMUSEMENTS ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 130–31
(London, J. Bew et al. [1793]); see also, e.g., EDWARD CHRISTIAN, NOTES TO BLACKSTONE’S
COMMENTARIES, Bk. II, at 576–77 (Dublin, P. Byrne 1797); EATON S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS 37–42, 116–17 (Boston, Little et al. 1879); 1
WILLIAM HAWKINS & THOMAS LEACH, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 477 n.7 (London, T.
Whieldon 6th ed. [1787]); 1 THOMAS W. WILLIAMS, AN ABRIDGMENT OF CASES ARGUED AND
DETERMINED IN THE COURTS OF LAW 117–20 (London, G.G. & J. Robinson 1798).
114
E.g., AN ADDRESS TO THE PARLIAMENT OF GREAT BRITAIN ON THE CLAIMS OF AUTHORS TO
THEIR OWN COPY-RIGHT 14, 39–44 (London, Longman et al. 2d ed. 1813).
TURERS OF
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most others. Whether one relies on the cumulative views of the jurists or
the “holding” of the House, those readings have, in a real sense, become
the conventional view of Donaldson and the purported origin of copyright
in 18th-century England: copyright was not created by statute but originated as a property right, inherent in authors, and protected at common law.
V. REINTERPRETATIONS OF THE ORIGIN OF COPYRIGHT
In the last fifty years, four scholars have challenged the conventional
interpretations of Donaldson. For some, their historical reexaminations
have been incidental to other scholarly objectives. These include John
Whicher and Mark Rose, to whom I will return in a moment. But for two
scholars in particular—Howard Abrams and Ronan Deazley—their
principal aim has been to demonstrate that the true origin of copyright was
statutory. In their view, the House of Lords held, as a body, that there
never was any such thing as a copyright at common law after first
publication. The true origin of copyright in published works was thus
strictly legislative. Deazley has gone further and argued, more
controversially to some, that the House also affirmatively ruled that
authors held no common-law copyrights in their works before first publishing them. Thus, by their lights, the only correct view of Donaldson is one
of the two possibilities offered by the first perspective described above.
Their argument comprises two parts. First, the official journal of the
House of Lords (as reflected in the journal itself or the Burrow and Brown
Reports) misreported the views of one of the judges. This concealed the
true position of the majority and misled readers into thinking the House
had adopted the reasoning of the judges. Second, in any case, the Lords’
speeches constituted the reasoning of the House and thus the law of
England. The following sections recount and critique these arguments.
A. Arguments
John Whicher was the first to argue that the Burrow and Brown
Reports misrepresented the views of one of the judges—Justice Nares of
the Common Pleas.116 The questionable reporting relates to the third and
fifth questions. On both, the Burrow Report recorded the judges as 6 to 5 in
favor of preemption. With regard to Nares in particular, it described him as
siding with the majority and opining that there was a common-law right
115
RONAN DEAZLEY, RETHINKING COPYRIGHT: HISTORY, THEORY, LANGUAGE 23–97, 167–77
(2006); DEAZLEY, supra note 6, at 218–19; accord Seville, supra note 9, at 828–67. I would add, based
on my own review of the cases and literature, that the second perspective is also very common.
116
John F. Whicher, The Ghost of Donaldson v. Beckett: An Inquiry into the Constitutional
Distribution of Powers over the Law of Literary Property in the United States (pt. 1), 9 BULL.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 102, 126–30 (1961). Whicher (and later Abrams after him) did not know
that the two Reports were, in this respect, based on the manuscript journal of the House of Lords.
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but that it was “taken away” by the Statute of Anne. The Brown Report,
correspondingly, listed Nares as one of the six judges in the majority that
opined against the perpetuity.117 Whicher discovered, however, that the
Pleadings and Cases Accounts from 1774 recorded Nares as stating that
the statute did not abridge the right. Believing the accounts were written by
different observers, he wrote that the “two anonymous reporters bear
common witness that Justice Nares vigorously supported the common law
right and opposed the idea of statutory preemption.”118 Whicher thus
posited that in reality a majority of the judges, 6 to 5, may have opined that
copyright was perpetual. His revised tally was incidental to his thesis, and
he did not go so far as to argue that the House had ruled that common-law
copyright never existed. Instead, he thought the grounds were opaque.119
Nevertheless, his findings served as a point of departure for others.
Howard Abrams was the first to pick things up where Whicher left off,
and in a seminal article in 1983 he argued that judges, lawyers, and
scholars had confounded the true holding of Donaldson for over 200 years.
According to Abrams, students of the case have improperly relied on the
judges’ answers, rather than the Lords’ speeches, and have done so partly
due to the misreported tally and partly due to misunderstanding how the
House of Lords operated.120 On the first point, Abrams starts by noting that
the most frequently cited reports of the case, the Burrow and Brown
Reports, contain the judges’ answers alone.121 Aggravating matters, he contends, those same reports incorrectly indicated that a majority of the judges
recommended reversing the decree. Here, he accepts Whicher’s theory that
Justice Nares was misreported. If Nares had been reported accurately,
Abrams argues, the Burrow and Brown Reports would have shown that a
majority of the judges actually advised the House that a common-law right
in published works survived the statute and that therefore the House ought
to affirm.122 That viewpoint would then have to be reconciled with the fact
the House reversed. Abrams suspects that if faced with that inconsistency,
the bench, bar, and commentators might have segregated the judges’
answers from the Lords’ speeches and focused on the latter.
Decoupling the speaking Lords from the judges, he additionally
argues, was something that should have been done in any event given that

117

Donaldson v. Becket, 4 Burr. 2408, 2410, 7 Bro. P.C. 88, 110 (H.L. 1774).
Whicher, supra note 116, at 129–30 (citing PLEADINGS, supra note 75, at 17–18; CASES, supra
note 76, at 35); see also, e.g., PLEADINGS, supra note 75, at 17 (“[Justice Nares] stated to the House
why he thought a Common Law right in Literary Property did exist, and why the statute of Queen Anne
did not take it away.”).
119
Whicher, supra note 116, at 126, 130.
120
Abrams, supra note 5, at 1128–29, 1156–57.
121
Id. at 1169–70.
122
Id. at 1160 n.175, 1164 n.189, 1164–70, 1188 n.(a).
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it was always the House, and not the judges, who decided the appeal.
Starting with the premise that the speeches of the Lords were the “law of
the case,”124 Abrams discusses all five Lords to varying degrees—Lord
Camden at length and the others only briefly. He then extrapolates that the
House of Lords as an institution “firmly rejected the existence of [an antecedent] common law copyright” and that as a consequence there was “no
historical justification whatsoever for the claim that copyright was recognized as a common law right of an author.”125 More recently, Abrams
has reaffirmed this position: “[T]he fact is . . . the House of Lords decided
the case on the ground that copyright did not exist at common law.”126
Mark Rose was next to cast a skeptical, but more reserved, eye at
Donaldson. Rose revealed that the Morning Chronicle was the first to
recount Justice Nares’s opinion, and that it too recorded that he was for a
perpetual right after the statute.127 Noting that the Chronicle’s publisher
William Woodfall was renowned for his accuracy in parliamentary
reporting, and that the stand-alone accounts, together with other newspaper
tallies, confirmed Woodfall’s account, Rose bolstered the view that the
Lords’ journal (and thus the Burrow and Brown Reports) should have
recorded the judges as 6 to 5 for a perpetual copyright.128 Somehow, the
clerk in the House must have misunderstood Nares. Rose also agreed with
Abrams that the mistake probably created a false sense of security that the
House simply followed the recommendation of the judges.129 Notably,
however, Rose denies Abrams’s claim on the true reasoning of Donaldson.
The most one can draw from the case on this point, Rose argues, was that
the House left the preexistence of common-law copyrights undecided.130
This brings us to Ronan Deazley, who has buttressed and expanded
Abrams’s conclusions. His outstanding work partly seeks to undercut the
reasoning of the judges who supported perpetual copyright in Millar and
Donaldson.131 But more important for our purposes, Deazley also argues,
like Abrams, that the holding in Donaldson has been misunderstood and
perhaps manipulated over the course of 200 years.132 After adopting the
revised Nares tally, he likewise posits that the misreported count has led
readers of Donaldson to wrongly believe that the judges’ answers
123

Id. at 1160–61.
Id. at 1169.
125
Id. at 1128; see also id. at 1164, 1184, 1186.
126
HOWARD B. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 1:6 n.4 (2014).
127
Mark Rose, The Author as Proprietor: Donaldson v. Becket and the Genealogy of Modern
Authorship, 23 REPRESENTATIONS 51, 67, 81–82 n.55 (1988).
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ROSE, supra note 28, at 98–99, 154–58.
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Id. at 157–58.
130
Id. at 102–03 & n.7; Rose, supra note 127, at 83 n.63.
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DEAZLEY, supra note 6, at 1–85.
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Id. at 218–19; Ronan Deazley, The Myth of Copyright at Common Law, 62 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
106, 118, 130 (2003).
124

28

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:1

“represent[ed] an accurate summary of the collective opinion of the House
itself.”133 He goes further than Abrams in one respect, however. Deazley
argues the House also ruled there never was a common-law copyright in
unpublished works. Undertaking his own review of the speeches, Deazley
contends a majority of them “explicitly denied the existence of any
common law right ab initio.”134 He then insists, as Abrams did before him,
that due to the appellate process of the time we must conclude that the
House as a whole “embraced” that position.135 Deazley’s expansion into
unpublished works has been the most controversial part of his scholarship,
but he seemed unwilling to cede the existence of an incorporeal right in
these works, perhaps recognizing that to do so might be an admission that
copyright still had as its origin a natural or customary right of the author.136
B. Response
The widespread influence of the modified account has been well
deserved; they have made a good case for it. Nevertheless, I must
respectfully disagree with my colleagues. My counterpoints are several,
and I believe they suffice to refute, or at least call into question, the two
main points made by these scholars.
1. Justice Nares
To start, the evidence uncovered on Justice Nares’s views is not as
well supported as it has been made it out to be. Although there appear to be
various narratives that support the revised view—e.g., the Morning
Chronicle, Gentleman’s Magazine, Pleadings Account, Cases Account, and
Cobbett Account—they all stem from the first of these: William
Woodfall’s report in the Chronicle.137 The two stand-alone accounts from
1774, for example, based their accounts on the Chronicle, either directly or
indirectly. The Pleadings Account is taken verbatim, and though the Cases
Account differs slightly it is clearly copied from the Pleadings Account.
Justice Nares spoke for nearly an hour and yet the two accounts
summarized his opinion in only a few paragraphs, touching the very same
issues, and in nearly the same way.138 It is true that the Cases Account adds
something not seen in the Pleadings Account or in the Chronicle—
individual answers to each of the five questions posed to Justice Nares—
but those answers were fabricated to track what had already been
133

Deazley, supra note 132, at 132; see also id. at 118, 125.
DEAZLEY, supra note 115, at 20 (first emphasis added).
135
DEAZLEY, supra note 6, at 210; see also id. at 217, 220.
136
Deazley leaves open the possibility that unpublished manuscripts were protected at common
law by a corporeal right stemming from ownership of the manuscript itself. Id. at 197–205.
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See supra text accompanying notes 69–87 and infra Appendix.
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PLEADINGS, supra note 75, at 17–18; CASES, supra note 76, at 35.
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plagiarized from Woodfall. This was something the Cases Account
compiler did when Woodfall had not already provided answers.
There are other London newspapers that agree with Woodfall’s
account, but they are not narratives and are, in any event, suspect. They
typically summarize the judges’ positions on whether copyright was
perpetual. In his work on Donaldson, Rose relies on a number of these.139
There are others as well.140 Similar summaries and tallies also made their
way into newspapers elsewhere in England and Ireland,141 and even into
the letters of persons in London coffeehouses.142 Yet there is no evidence
they were written by correspondents who attended the appeal on the day
Justice Nares spoke. Rather, it is much more likely they copied the news
from other newspapers, which was a widespread practice at the time.143
Can we conclude the Chronicle was the progenitor of them all? It
certainly is possible. Woodfall was the first to recount Nares’s opinion—an
opinion Woodfall published on the morning of February 16—and nearly all
the other London papers were published one or more days afterward.144 It
was also a regular practice of London papers to rely on Woodfall’s Chronicle for parliamentary reporting, given his reputation in that regard.145
Much of the revised history thus depends on Woodfall’s accuracy. Did
he in fact report Justice Nares correctly? It is difficult to know for certain
because Nares’s personal papers no longer survive. Nevertheless, the
weight of the evidence militates heavily against Woodfall, not for him.
For one, there are other newspaper accounts that contradict the
Chronicle. Nearly all are from papers in Scotland that seem to have used
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ROSE, supra note 28, at 155; see also DEAZLEY, supra note 6, at 199 & n.40.
E.g., GENERAL EVENING POST (London), Feb. 19, 1774, at 1; MIDDLESEX JOURNAL (London),
Feb. 19, 1774, at 1; WESTMINSTER JOURNAL (London), Feb. 19, 1774, at 3.
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E.g., IPSWICH JOURNAL, Feb. 19, 1774, at 2; JACKSON’S OXFORD JOURNAL, Feb. 19, 1774, at
2; LEINSTER JOURNAL (Kilkenny), Mar. 5, 1774, at 1; MANCHESTER MERCURY, Feb. 22, 1774, at 4.
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Letter from J. Grove to J. Grimston (Feb. 22, 1774), ERY MS DDGR/42/31/XV.
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See generally Mary Ransome, The Reliability of Contemporary Reporting of Debates of the
House of Commons, 1727–1741, 24 BULL. INST. HIST. RES. 67, 68–69 (1942); Will Slauter, A Trojan
Horse in Parliament: International Publicity in the Age of the American Revolution, in INTO PRINT:
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We are fortunate to have specific evidence, taken from a prosecution brought against Woodfall
for publishing a libelous letter in the same February 16 issue, that the paper was printed early that morning. Case, Att’y Gen. v. W. Woodfall, PRO TS11/24 (K.B. 1774). The Public Advertiser also appeared on February 16, but that paper was published by Woodfall’s brother Henry Sampson Woodfall.
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293–94 (Merle M. Bevington ed., 1954) (recalling Woodfall’s practices in the 1780s).
140

30

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:1
146

their own correspondents for some of their reports. Scottish booksellers
had a particular interest in the case. The appellants, Alexander and John
Donaldson, were Scots and, though they were working in London at the
time of the dispute, they usually printed their books in Scotland and thus
stood as proxies for its entire reprint industry. Quite simply, the Scottish
trade had good reasons and means for obtaining its own news.
Take, for example, the Caledonian Mercury. It reported on February
19 that “though [Justice Nares] was inclined to think, that authors had a
right at common-law; yet he was of opinion, that right was taken away by
the statute of Queen Anne.”147 The Edinburgh Evening Courant was of the
same view, noting that “Mr Justice Nares also gave his opinion for the
appellants”148 and that as of February 17, “five of the Judges [had given]
their opinions against the perpetual monopoly, viz. Mr Baron Eyre, Mr
Justice Nares, Mr Baron Perrot, Mr Justice Gould, and Mr Baron
Adams.”149 Last but not least, the Edinburgh Advertiser, which was
published by James Donaldson, the son of the appellant Alexander
Donaldson,150 reached the same conclusion and provided readers with the
following summary:
The Opinions of the JUDGES are,
For the APPELLANTS, (for the
limited monopoly in books.)

For the RESPONDENTS.
(For the perpetual monopoly in
books.)

COURT of COMMON PLEAS.
1. Chief Justice DE GREY
2. Sir HENRY GOULD.
3. Sir GEORGE NARES.
COURT OF EXCHEQUER.
4. Sir RICHARD ADAMS.
5. GEORGE PERROT, Esq.
6. Sir JAMES EYRE.

COURT of KING’S BENCH.
1. Sir RICHARD ASTON.
2. EDWARD WILLES, Esq.
3. Sir W. H. ASHURST.
COURT of COMMON PLEAS.
4. Sir WILLIAM BLACKSTONE.
COURT of EXCHEQUER
151
5. Lord Chief Baron SMYTH.

It is possible, and in some instances provable, that a few Scottish papers
relied on a compatriot paper.152 Even so, it appears we are left with two
types of accounts: those based on Woodfall and those that are not.

146

For a London periodical that suggests Justice Nares was against a perpetual right, see 6 TOWN
(London, A. Hamilton 1774) (Feb. issue).
147
CALEDONIAN MERCURY (Edinburgh), Feb. 19, 1774, at 2; accord id. Feb. 23, 1774, at 2.
148
EDINBURGH EVENING COURANT, Feb. 19, 1774, at 2.
149
Id. Feb. 23, 1774, at 1.
150
ROBERT T. SKINNER, A NOTABLE FAMILY OF SCOTS PRINTERS 1–8 (1927).
151
EDINBURGH ADVERTISER, Feb. 25, 1774, at 124; accord id. Feb. 22, 1774, at 117; WEEKLY
MAGAZINE (Edinburgh), Feb. 24, 1774, at 286.
152
See Appendix infra.
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The elephant in the room is the official record of the House of Lords.
On the day that Justice Nares spoke, the Clerk Assistant Samuel Strutt,153
or one of his deputies, noted in his minute book that Nares believed there
was a common-law right but that the Statute of Anne preempted it:
Upon the Third Question deliver’d his Opinion, That such
Action at Common Law is taken away by the Statute 8.th
Anne and that an Author by the said Statute is precluded
from every Remedy except on the Foundation of the said
Statute and on the Terms and Conditions prescribed
thereby.—And gave his Reasons.
....
Upon the fifth Question deliver’d his Opinion That this
Right is impeached restrained and taken away by the Statute
8.th Anne—And gave his Reasons.154
This account was later moved to the manuscript journal without
modification,155 and from there to the Burrow and Brown Reports.
The exact manner in which these entries were generated is a mystery.
Donaldson scholars have always assumed that the clerk was expected to
divine the answers to the five questions that were asked of the eleven
judges solely from the reasons offered by those judges in open court. But
there are other possibilities. Given the number of questions posed, perhaps
the judges, who had conferred twice beforehand, provided their answers in
writing to the clerk and left only the opinions or reasons to be said in the
House. Or perhaps each judge read his answers to the questions either
before or after entering into his reasons for them. It is true that Woodfall
did not systematically report the answers in his account, and thus one
might argue that the answers had not been spoken aloud. But there would
have been no need for him to do so, as he would have known that the clerk
would memorialize the same in the minutes, as was customary. At the very
least, it seems reasonable to presume that the clerk received some verification from the judges. The clerk knew his tally of the 55 answers would
be relayed to and relied upon by the Lords. He thus may have shown his
notes to the judges after each opinion or after all the opinions on a given
day. Notably, the minutes do bear a few marks of correction for Justice
Ashurst,156 though admittedly the source of the correction is unknown.

153
J.C. SAINTY, THE PARLIAMENT OFFICE IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES:
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES ON CLERKS IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS 1600 TO 1800, at 9, 22 (1977).
154
MS Minutes of the House of Lords, PA HL/PO/JO/5/1/121 (Feb. 15, 1774).
155
MS Journal of the House of Lords, PA HL/PO/JO/1/145, pp. 95–96 (Feb. 15, 1774).
156
MS Minutes of the House of Lords, PA HL/PO/JO/5/1/121 (Feb. 15, 1774).
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There is more evidence still that Woodfall was mistaken. First are the
printed cases that were distributed to the Lords before the hearing, as
required by House rules. Of the nine surviving copies I have reviewed,
seven have manuscript annotations dated February 22, 1774, the day the
House voted, confirming the orthodox 6-to-5 tally. The copy in the
Parliamentary Archives states: “NB. Six of the Judges were ag:st the
Perpetuity and Five for it.”157 Most of these are probably leftover cases
marked and sold by the Door-Keepers—a common practice.158
The most compelling evidence stems from proceedings taken a few
months after Donaldson on a bill in the House of Commons to protect
certain works for an additional 14 years. In that context, the orthodox count
was again confirmed, this time by other persons we would expect to be
well informed of the appeal. In support of the bill, counsel for the
booksellers of London, James Mansfield (no relation to Lord Mansfield),
stated that only “five of the judges, when giving their opinion in the House
of Lords,” believed that copyright was perpetual.159 This report of
Mansfield’s views, which also comes from Woodfall’s newspaper, is
confirmed by Henry Cavendish, a member of the Commons who regularly
took notes of the debates in that House. He wrote that Mansfield had said:
[F]ive Judges thought clearly in favour of the right; & of
those who disputed it, two thought it had existence at
Common-law, but that the Statute of Queen Anne had
abrogated it. [S]o that there were seven who decided in
favour of it as an original right inherent in the author . . . .160
Alexander Wedderburn, one of the barristers who argued for the
London booksellers in Donaldson, was of the same view.161 So was the
written case that was submitted to Parliament in support of the bill.162 And
the opposition characterized the tally the same way. Arthur Murphy, who
represented the Donaldsons in their appeal and in opposing the bill, wrote:
“[I]n the House of Lords six of the Judges were decisively of Opinion, that

157
THE CASE OF THE RESPONDENTS iiiv (s.l.n. 1774), PA HL/PO/JU/4/3/18; accord THE CASE OF
RESPONDENTS iiir–v (s.l.n. 1774), BL 1483.dd.1(73); THE CASE OF THE RESPONDENTS iiir–v (s.l.n.
1774), BL L.3.a.1[vol. 17](132); THE CASE OF THE RESPONDENTS iiiv (s.l.n. 1774), SL Session Papers
F31:6; THE CASE OF THE APPELLANTS 9v (s.l.n. 1774), AL House of Lords Papers, Appeal Cases,
1772–1774; THE CASE OF THE APPELLANTS 9v (s.l.n. 1774), KI Petitions v.41[6]; THE CASE OF THE
APPELLANTS 9v (s.l.n. 1774), OHL KF 223 G741, set 1, v. 2, p. 156.
158
Cf. THOMAS OSBORNE, ADVERTISEMENT 1 (s.l.n. [c.1758]), Bodl. J.J. Book Trade Docs. No.
25 (advertising printed cases previously purchased from the estate of a Door-Keeper).
159
MORNING CHRONICLE (London), May 16, 1774, at 4.
160
Henry Cavendish, Debates in the Commons, BL Egerton MS 259, pp. 35–36 (May 13, 1774).
161
MORNING CHRONICLE (London), Mar. 26, 1774, at 2.
162
THE CASE OF THE BOOKSELLERS OF LONDON AND WESTMINSTER 2 (s.l.n. [1774]), Bodl. Carte
MS 207, No. 6, Bodl. Vet. 2581.c.5(3).
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the Decree against Donaldson ought to be reversed.” It would be quite
remarkable (and unlikely) for the clerk in the House of Lords and counsel
on both sides to be mistaken on this point. Rather, this appears to be one of
those many instances where a journalist has misreported legal proceedings.
So how could Woodfall have made this error? It is true that he was
blessed with awe-inspiring powers of recall, leading to the sobriquet
“memory Woodfall,”164 but he was not infallible. For one, Woodfall heard
four opinions on the day that Justice Nares spoke, spanning the course of
about two hours, and he could not write down a single word until he
returned to his establishment.165 The clerk, on the other hand, could write
as much as he pleased. Compounding matters, Woodfall likely had other
things on his mind that day. His brother Henry, the publisher of the Public
Advertiser, had been arrested by the House of Commons the evening
before Justice Nares spoke (and remained in custody until March 2).166 His
offense was publishing a letter that criticized the Speaker of the Commons.
According to Henry, this confinement seriously disrupted his business,167 a
business that William probably would have had to help shore up.

***
In sum, I must respectfully disagree with the conclusions of my
colleagues that the clerk misreported Justice Nares, and that the House of
Lords rejected a recommendation of the judges to affirm and instead
adopted the advice of the speaking Lords to reverse. In fact, it appears that
both majorities agreed the House should reverse, albeit not on the very
same grounds.
2. The House of Lords
As for the reasoning of the House, this is an area where I again part
ways with Abrams and Deazley (but concur with Whicher and Rose).168
163
[ARTHUR MURPHY], OBSERVATIONS ON THE CASE OF THE BOOKSELLERS OF LONDON AND
WESTMINSTER 2 (s.l.n. [1774]), BL 215.i.4(99); see also CALEDONIAN MERCURY (Edinburgh), Mar.
21, 1774, at 1 (attributing authorship of the Observations pamphlet to Arthur Murphy).
164
NIKKI HESSELL, LITERARY AUTHORS, PARLIAMENTARY REPORTERS 64 (2012).
165
See MACDONAGH, supra note 68, at 268–69, 281, 287; accord MORNING CHRONICLE
(London), Feb. 14, 1774, at 2 (publishing a letter from a reader remarking on Woodfall’s practices).
166
34 H.C. JOUR. 456, 526–27 (Feb. 14 & Mar. 2, 1774); PUBLIC ADVERTISER (London), Feb. 16,
1774, at 2.
167
34 H.C. JOUR. 526–27 (Mar. 2, 1774). In an affidavit in an unrelated case, Henry later recalled
that “on Tuesday the 15.th day of Febry . . . being the first Day and a very few hours after this Dep.t was
taken into Custody as afores.d he was in so much hurry and Confusion from the great number of
persons who came to see him [in custody] and the situation he was then in, that [he] did not and could
not possibly attend to any Business.” Affidavit of Henry Sampson Woodfall, Nov. 15, 1774, Att’y Gen.
v. H.S. Woodfall, PRO TS11/24 (K.B. 1774).
168
For other scholars agreeing with Rose that the reasoning is opaque, see ALEXANDER, supra
note 28, at 37–38; 5 DAVID M. WALKER, A LEGAL HISTORY OF SCOTLAND 770 (1998); W.R. Cornish,

34

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:1

Discerning the grounds of an appeal decided in 1774 was, and remains, a
pragmatic exercise that sometimes results in frustration for lawyers and
judges. One has to determine the views of a court that permitted all of its
members to vote on appeals, ruled without articulating reasons of the
House, and restricted the publication of its own proceedings.
The most certain way to ascertain a decision’s reasoning is to consult
the judgment,169 but judgments are rarely so transparent. Sometimes other
direct evidence exists of the grounds the whole House relied upon.170 But
as this is not often the case, one must typically apply various means of
deduction. An affirmance might suggest, for example, that the House
rejected all of the dispositive grounds the appellant advanced in his printed
case. A rationale might also be plain in cases of reversal or variance if
there was only one possible ground for doing so. And, of course, a
consistent opinion of the judges and speaking Lords offers some insight.
Unfortunately, none of these circumstances is present in Donaldson.
The House reversed on one or more of three possible grounds: authors held
no common-law rights; their rights were lost upon publication; or their
rights were preempted. The opinions of the judges also differed in many
respects from the speaking Lords. Making matters worse, 84 Lords
attended on the day of judgment and each was entitled to vote or not as he
pleased and to do so on whatever grounds he saw fit. Lysander Spooner
described the difficulties in 1855: “How many of those lords, who voted
for the reversal, did so in the belief that there was no copyright at common
law; and how many did so in the belief that the common law copyright had
been taken away by the statute, does not appear.”171 For all we know, the
Lords adopted the suggestion of the Bishop of Carlisle to limit their
thinking and deliberation to the issue of preemption. This problem is not
unique to Donaldson. Bill Cornish recently observed that “[s]o long as the
House of Lords acted as an ultimate authority in the settlement of disputes
by voting rather than by articulating reasons for judgment, it was difficult
to treat its decisions as settling legal rules in a general sense.”172
Abrams and Deazley argue that the matter is not as complicated as it
has been made out to be, and that we can and indeed must adopt the
The Author’s Surrogate: The Genesis of British Copyright, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL HISTORY
254, 262 (Katherine O’Donovan & Gerry R. Rubin eds., 2000); Ginsburg, supra note 36, at 651.
169
E.g., Dowager of Marlborough v. Strong, 22 H.L. JOUR. 270 (H.L. 1723/4); Barnardiston v.
Rex, 14 H.L. JOUR. 210 (H.L. 1689).
170
E.g., MacCullock v. MacCullock, 2 Pat. App. 33, 36 (H.L. 1759); Gordon v. His Majesty’s
Advocate, 1 Pat. App. 558, 567 (H.L. 1754).
171
LYSANDER SPOONER, THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 212 (Boston, B. Marsh 1855).
172
11 WILLIAM CORNISH ET AL., THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 48 (2010);
accord CARLETON KEMP ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 220–21 (7th ed. 1964); EDWARD SUGDEN, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY AS ADMINISTERED IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS 39–42 (London, S.
Sweet 1849); see also Cornish, supra note 168, at 261–62 (applying the same concern to Donaldson).
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speeches of the Lords as the holding in Donaldson. Both scholars state that
“while ‘the judicial [opinions] were only advisory,’ ‘the Lords’ statements
were the law of the case.’”173 Neither explains precisely what is meant by
this statement, but given the contexts in which it was made and the
conclusions that are drawn, they appear to argue that certain rules or
doctrines at the time dictated that the speeches of the Lords, when made on
the winning side, constituted the reasons of the House. Stated another way,
the speaking Lords decided the case, not the House as a whole, and,
consequently, we must disregard the advice offered by the judges and the
fact that many other Lords potentially voted on the appeal.
I believe this to be incorrect for a number of reasons. First and
foremost, it is difficult in this context to consider the speaking Lords (even
the law Lords) as any different from the judges given that the speeches
were just as advisory as the opinions. Lords were free to side against the
speakers,174 and lay Lords could even cause the House to rule against the
wishes of the law Lords, something that happened in years on either side of
Donaldson.175 As Edward Sugden noted many years later:
[T]he Lords are entitled to require the Judges to give them
their opinions, which opinions are to instruct and guide them,
although they are not binding on them. . . . Now the law
Lords can both advise the House and vote in favour of their
own views; but their opinions are no more binding on the
House than the opinions of the learned Judges.176
The time at which the speeches were made also bears this out. The
Lords spoke before the vote, not after, because the speeches served to explain why a Lord planned to vote a particular way and to urge his
colleagues to do the same. Indeed, speakers would not necessarily know
whether they would end up in the majority. Although the law Lords might
confer among themselves before their speeches, they would not formally
confer with the whole House beforehand. It thus seems hard to imagine
that the speaking Lords always expected their speeches to represent the

173

DEAZLEY, supra note 6, at 217 (quoting Abrams, supra note 5, at 1169); see also id. at 210.
E.g., Douglas v. Hamilton (H.L. 1769), in 2 COLLECTANEA JURIDICA 386, 404 ([Francis
Hargrave] ed., London, E. & R. Brooke 1792).
175
E.g., Hill v. St. John, 7 Bro. P.C. 353, 368, cit. 2 W. Black 933 (H.L. 1775) (noting that the
House had affirmed even though Lords Apsley and Camden had urged it to reverse); Pomfret v. Smith,
6 Bro. P.C. 434 (H.L. 1771); LONDON EVENING-POST, Mar. 9, 1771, at 4 (noting that the House had
reversed and ordered a new trial in Pomfret against the advice of Lords Apsley and Camden).
176
SUGDEN, supra note 172, at 32. Sugden wrote these words at a time when the law Lords
decided appeals without the rest of the House. And because the law Lords were in all but name the
actual court of appeal, their views were no longer merely advisory. Nostalgic, he lamented this fact
because it meant that a few law Lords could trump the views of the bulk of the judges. Id. at 26–33.
174
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views of those on their side, let alone the judgment of the House, particularly when the case was contentious and drew the opinions of the judges.
Additionally, if the speeches were thought to be paramount, one would
have expected House procedures to not hinder their dissemination. And yet
the opposite was true. Members of the public were not permitted to take
notes of the speeches,178 and no one was allowed to publish them. To be
sure, speeches were sometimes published, perhaps even with the help of a
Lord, but this occurred in a haphazard way and not in observance of an
expressed rule that the speech would constitute the reasons of the whole
House. In any case, apart from some slips, the prohibitions were very
successful. At the time of Donaldson, there had been only one published
collection of appeals and writs of error in the House of Lords.179 As I
previously noted, the House reprimanded the publisher.180 This was done
even though he omitted (with one exception) the speeches of the Lords.
Thereafter, no new collection of parliamentary cases was published,
whether authorized or not, until Josiah Brown gave us the first book of his
multi-volume series in 1779.181 With a few exceptions, he too omitted the
speeches of the Lords. The next sets of parliamentary reports in 1789,
1803, and 1807 operated under similar conventions.182 Indeed, it was not
until 1814 that reports regularly included the speeches of the Lords.183
Remarkably, apart from the judgments, the only thing the Lords’ journal
thought worthy of reporting publicly were the answers of the judges.184
With respect to cases decided in 1774, the most that can be said is that
because the House usually ruled as the law Lords advised—be it to affirm,
reverse, or vary—we should presume that the House also followed the
177
Accord CHARLES MARSH DENISON & CHARLES HENDERSON SCOTT, THE PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS 116–17 (London, Butterworths 1879).
178
Cf. 1 BOSWELL, supra note 57, at 377 (indicating in 1772 that counsel on appeals were
permitted to take notes); accord BOSWELL FOR THE DEFENCE, supra note 57, at 116, 180.
179
[BARTHOLOMEW SHOWER], CASES IN PARLIAMENT (London, A. & J. Churchill 1698). On the
reporting of parliamentary cases as part of reports of other courts, see the correspondence between
Lord Hardwicke and Justice Foster of the King’s Bench in MICHAEL DODSON, THE LIFE OF SIR MICHAEL FOSTER, KNT. 45–49 (London, J. Johnson & Co. 1811) (Feb. 2, 1761, Mar. 30 & Apr. 2, 1762).
180
See supra text accompanying note 64.
181
1 JOSIAH BROWN, REPORTS OF CASES UPON APPEALS AND WRITS OF ERROR (London,
Majesty’s Law-Printers 1779).
182
RICHARD COLLES, REPORTS OF CASES UPON APPEALS AND WRITS OF ERROR (Dublin, E.
Lynch 1789); 1 JOSIAH BROWN & T.E. TOMLINS, REPORTS OF CASES UPON APPEALS AND WRITS OF
ERROR (London, A. Strahan 2d ed. 1803); 1 DAVID ROBERTSON, REPORTS OF CASES ON APPEAL FROM
SCOTLAND, DECIDED IN THE HOUSE OF PEERS (London, A. Strahan 1807).
183
1 PATRICK DOW, REPORTS OF CASES UPON APPEALS AND WRITS OF ERROR IN THE HOUSE OF
LORDS (London, W. Clarke & Sons 1814); see also 1 JOHN CRAIGIE ET AL., REPORTS OF CASES
DECIDED IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS, UPON APPEAL FROM SCOTLAND (Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark 1849).
184
In later years, the journal also regularly reported the opinions of the judges. E.g., Croft v.
Lumley, 90 H.L. JOUR. 32–43 (H.L. 1858); Scott v. Avery, 88 H.L. JOUR. 165–71 (H.L. 1856); Jefferys
v. Boosey, 86 H.L. JOUR. 299–322 (H.L. 1854); Gosling v. Veley, 84 H.L. JOUR. 324–40 (H.L. 1852).
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reasoning of the law Lords as expressed in their speeches. Law Lords, as
contrasted with lay Lords, merited special reverence due to their legal
training and experience. But this presumption, if one can call it that, seems
most helpful in instances where the Lords heard an appeal or writ of error
without the assistance of the judges.185 This follows because in cases like
Donaldson, where the judges were summoned, we encounter a like
presumption that the House usually followed the judges. About 100 years
prior to Donaldson, Chief Justice Hale wrote the following:
[S]ince the time that the whole decision of errors have been
practised in the house of lords by their votes, the judges have
been always consulted withal, and their opinion held so
sacred, that the lords have ever conformed their judgments
thereunto, unless in cases where all the judges were parties to
the former judgment, as in the case of ship money.[186] . . .
[T]hough for many years last past they have had only voices
of advice and assistance not authoritative or decisive; yet
their opinions have been always the rules, whereby the lords
do or should proceed in matters of law . . . .187
The records of the mid-to-late 18th century indicate that this largely
remained true. There are very few instances where the House defied the
judges. From 1730 to 1800, inclusive, the judges offered advice in 83
appeals and writs of error. But in only four do the records show the House
voting in a manner inconsistent with the views of the judges; and in three
of those cases the vote also went against the majority of the law Lords.188
Presumptions can fall away, of course, such as where the judges advise
the House to affirm, but the law Lords urge it to reverse. In such a case, if
the House reverses, one would be hard pressed to argue that the House
followed the reasoning of the majority of the judges. It is thus easy to un185
E.g., Arthur v. Arthur, 21 H.L. JOUR. 280, 2 Bro. P.C. 143 (H.L. 1720); see also Anita Jane
Rees, The Practice and Procedure of the House of Lords 1714–1784, at 157 (1987) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Wales) (recounting a letter regarding the appeal in Arthur where a visitor to
the House was told that “‘there are three or four Lords in the House who understand the Laws very well
and give attention; and the House always gives in to their opinion’”) (quoting Letter from D. Forbes to
Lord Grange (Apr. 1, 1720), NAS GD124/15/1197/33); 11 THE PARLIAMENTARY REGISTER 216–17
(London, J. Debrett 1783) (noting that “it was for the most part customary to leave the judgment to the
Law Lords” and “very rarely it was that the lay Lords interfered” by voting against the law Lords).
186
Rex v. Hampden, 3 How. St. Tr. col. 825 (Exch. Chamb. 1638). The case was unusual and led
to judicial impeachments. D.L. Keir, The Case of Ship-Money, 52 L.Q. REV. 546, 546 (1936).
187
MATTHEW HALE, THE JURISDICTION OF THE LORDS HOUSE 158–59 (London, T. Cadell Jr. &
W. Davies 1796) (written c.1669).
188
Bishop of London v. Ffytche, 36 H.L. JOUR. 683–85, 687, 2 Bro. P.C. (2d ed.) 211, 217–19
(H.L. 1783); PUBLIC ADVERTISER (London), June 6, 1783, at 3 (division list in Ffytche); Hill v. St.
John, 34 H.L. JOUR. 443, 7 Bro. P.C. 353, 368 (H.L. 1775); Archbishop of Armagh v. King, 23 H.L.
JOUR. 545, 1 Barn. K.B. 329, 329, cit. 2 Strange 837, 843 (H.L. 1730); see also Foley v. Burnell, 37
H.L. JOUR. 248–49, 4 Bro P.C. (2d ed.) 319, 328 (H.L. 1785) (voting against the judges only).
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derstand why one might believe that the speeches of the Lords in Donaldson constituted the law of the case; it has been increasingly thought over
the last fifty years that Donaldson fell into this category. But as I have
already argued, and I hope demonstrated, Donaldson is not one of those
cases. Rather, we have a majority of the judges and a majority of the law
(and lay) Lords advising the House to reverse, which is what it then did.
The manner in which appeals were heard eventually changed in such a
way as to support the rule advanced by Abrams and Deazley, but not for
many years. In 1823, toward the end of Lord Eldon’s tenure, it became
usual for the law Lords to decide appeals without the rest of the House. A
few lay peers would attend to reach the required quorum of three, but they
typically would not vote.189 By the late 1830s, the House counted seven
law Lords among its members, and their numbers were often enough to sit
without the need of lay peers.190 Thus, in 1839, James Stewart wrote that
“it is not now the practice of the whole body of the house to attend to its
judicial business. This is usually transacted entirely by the lord chancellor,
speakers, or other peers, who have at one time filled judicial situations.”191
Even still, it was not until 1844 that the convention was established that lay
Lords should never vote on appellate matters.192 It was only with these
changes, combined with proper reporting, that one could expect that the
Lords who spoke were the ones who decided the appeal and that their
words reflected the reasoning of the House. Stated elsewise, the speeches
were no longer advisory, but became more akin to judgments of a court.193
Something also must be said of the authorities cited by Abrams and
Deazley. Abrams cites only one source to support his principal thesis—that
in 1774 the speeches of the Lords constituted the holding of the case—but
it is unsupportive and otherwise inapposite because it speaks of a time
when appellate practices in the House of Lords differed greatly.194 Deazley
largely relies on Abrams, but he does go further and discusses evidence
189
C.P. COOPER, A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF SOME OF THE MOST IMPORTANT PROCEEDINGS IN
PARLIAMENT 409 (London, J. Murray 1828); ROBERT STEVENS, LAW AND POLITICS: THE HOUSE OF
LORDS AS A JUDICIAL BODY, 1800–1976, at 19–22 (1978); see also STANDING ORDERS OF THE HOUSE
OF LORDS 135–36 (s.l.n. 1825) (July 7, 1823) (requiring three Lords to attend appeals by rota).
190
STEVENS, supra note 189, at 29–40.
191
JAMES STEWART, THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS 9 (London, E. Spettigue 1839) (contrasting with
the method that existed at the time Justice Blackstone published his Commentaries in the 1760s).
192
STEVENS, supra note 189, at 29–34; accord 11 CORNISH ET AL., supra note 172, at 528–37.
193
Accord TIMES (London), Sept. 5, 1844, at 4 (noting that the custom that “prevents any but law
Lords [from] voting” makes the “decision of certain law Lords” the decision of the House); 60
EDINBURGH REVIEW, OR CRITICAL JOURNAL 24–25 (Edinburgh, Longman et al. 1835) (“[T]he
judgment of the Lords, though technically and formally that of the whole House, is practically and
substantially nothing more than the judgment of the Lord Chancellor; or of the Lord Chancellor and
other law lords who have been raised to the peerage.”).
194
Abrams, supra note 5, at 1169, 1160 n.175 (citing 10 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 609–11 (1938) (citing Palgrave, Brown & Son v. S.S. Turid, [1922] 1 A.C. 397, 413)).
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that requires our attention. As proof of the supremacy of the speeches,
Deazley cites a portion of the proceedings taken in Parliament in 1774 to
protect certain works for an additional 14 years.195 Six days after the
decision in Donaldson, a group of aggrieved booksellers petitioned for a
bill, stating that
by a late Decision of the House of Peers, such Common Law
Right of Authors and their Assigns hath been declared to
have no Existence, whereby the Petitioners will be very great
Sufferers, through their involuntary Misapprehension of the
Law.196
The preamble of the bill similarly stated that “it hath lately been adjudged
in the House of Lords that no such copy right in authors or their assigns
doth exist at common law.”197 From these statements, my friend concludes
that “it is clear that the decision of the peers was initially understood to
have dismissed any notion of a common law right,” and that the “booksellers themselves [concluded that] the House of Lords had denied that any
common law copyright predated the Statute of Anne; the legislation had in
fact created a new, temporally limited, property right in literary works.”198
Deazley’s interpretation of this language is certainly sensible. In fact,
he was not the first to read it that way. Alexander Donaldson seized on the
very same language in petitioning against the bill in the House of Lords.199
As others who opposed the bill were wont to do,200 Donaldson pressed the
same arguments that he made during the appeal—including that there was
no antecedent right—and he declared that the House of Lords had reached
the same conclusion. As Paul Feilde, who supported the booksellers’ bill,
aptly (and perhaps cynically) noted at the time: “[E]very body that supports the decision of the H of L says that at the time of making the Statute
of Queen Anne, no such thing existed as Copyright at Common Law.”201
Nevertheless, another interpretation of the petition and bill is plausible.
By stating that the common-law right has “no Existence” or “doth [not]
exist,” the petitioners, who cared most about whether they retained perpetual copyrights after the statute, could very well have meant that the common-law right does not now exist rather than that the right never existed.
195

DEAZLEY, supra note 6, at 213–18.
34 H.C. JOUR. 513 (Feb. 28, 1774).
197
An Act for Relief of Booksellers and Others, PA HL/PO/JO/10/2/53 (1774). The bill was also
printed. AN ACT FOR RELIEF OF BOOKSELLERS AND OTHERS (s.l.n. 1774).
198
DEAZLEY, supra note 6, at 217, 218.
199
COPY OF ALEXANDER DONALDSON’S PETITION TO THE HOUSE OF LORDS, AGAINST THE
LONDON BOOKSELLERS BILL 2 (s.l.n. 1774), HSP AB-[1774]-29.
200
E.g., Diary of Jacob Pleydell-Bouverie, WSA 1946/4/2F/1/3 (May 16, 1774); Cavendish,
supra note 160, at 90 (May 16, 1774) (Pleydell-Bouverie).
201
Cavendish, supra note 160, at 119 (May 16, 1774).
196
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The thrust of their written case was that they legitimately believed they
held common-law rights that survived the Statute of Anne.202 As a
consequence, they had purchased copyrights that were outside the statutory
terms and some within but at prices that presumed the rights were
perpetual. To take the perpetual right away so swiftly would constitute an
extreme hardship. Insisting their belief was genuine, the petitioners cited
the savings clause of the Statute of Anne and said it had led them to
conceive “that the Act did not affect or take away the Common Law Right
supposed to be vested in the Authors of Books, and their Assigns, in Perpetuity.”203 Their position was also confirmed, they noted, by the King’s
Bench in Millar. Turning next to Donaldson, they observed that the House
of Lords had declared the “before supposed Common Law Copy Right in
Books,” meaning a common-law right that persisted after the statute, “to
have no Existence.”204 The petitioners stressed that their misapprehension
was the more excusable because the judges in Donaldson nearly supported
a “Common Law Copy Right . . . in Perpetuity.”205 A majority of the
judges had opined that a common-law right existed before the statute and
“many of them” declared the statute did not abridge the right.206 Notably, a
similar description of the “common law right” is given in the petition and
the preamble of the bill, both of which also refer to “such” right.207
Stated another way, the phrases “common law right” or “copy right”
were sometimes used as a shorthand for the idea of a perpetual copyright
that survived and subsisted alongside the statute.208 This was how William
Woodfall used the term when he reported the arguments of James
Mansfield, one of the counsel who argued for the bill on behalf of the
petitioners. And if we are to countenance the accuracy of Woodfall, then it
appears that Mansfield himself sometimes used the words in this manner:
It has been strongly contested . . . that the petitioners were
not at all mistaken respecting the non-existence of a common
law right . . . . Sir, . . . it is evident that they did misconceive,
and I do not wonder at it, when I recollect that the highest
court of law in Westminster Hall [the Court of King’s Bench]
202

CASE OF THE BOOKSELLERS, supra note 162, at 1–2.
Id. at 1.
204
Id. at 2.
205
Id.
206
Id. In response to this point, Arthur Murphy observed that the issue was not as close as
imagined: “[I]n the House of Lords six of the Judges were decisively of Opinion, that the Decree
against Donaldson ought to be reversed : To those six may be added the authority of the late Sir JOSEPH
YATES, Lord CAMDEN, and the Lord HIGH CHANCELLOR.” MURPHY, supra note 163, at 2.
207
See supra text accompanying notes 196–197.
208
E.g., Donaldson v. Becket, 7 Bro. P.C. 88, 110 (H.L. 1774) (Josiah Brown) (using the terms
synonymously: “[Five of the judges were] in favour of the perpetuity, or common law right; and the
other six . . . were of opinion against it . . . .”).
203

2014]

COPYRIGHT AT COMMON LAW IN 1774

41

equally misconceived it, and that five of the judges, when
giving their opinion in the House of Lords, immediately
previous to the late determination[,] were also of the same
sentiments . . . .209
The judges referred to, of course, were the five who thought that copyright
was perpetual despite the Statute of Anne, and not the seven who believed
in an original right inherent in the author.
Woodfall also reported Alexander Wedderburn as using the phrase
“Common-Law Right” similarly. Wedderburn had been appointed to draft
the bill submitted to the Commons and had spoken on behalf of the
petitioners.210 According to Woodfall, Wedderburn stated:
Three out of four Judges [in Millar]. . . had fully . . .
convinced not only the booksellers, but at least half the
public, that a Common-Law Right did exist; and even in the
late decision [in Donaldson], the opinion of the great
luminary of the law [Lord Mansfield], was supported nearly
by half the number of Judges [i.e., by five of the judges].211
Notably, Wedderburn also purportedly described Donaldson as a “determination that there was no common-law right for a perpetuity . . . .”212
In short, the documents that Deazley cites—the petition and the preamble to the bill—are ambiguous. It is unfortunate the petitioners were not
more precise. Perhaps they did not perceive a need to be; they may have
believed the reasoning was obvious to all concerned. But another possibility is that their imprecision came about by necessity. Although they undoubtedly understood that the House had rejected perpetual copyrights, the
petitioners may not have known the exact reasons underlying the decision
because of the single question posed to the Lords and the manner of voting.
3. Perceptions Redux
Although I doubt that the petitioners used the aforementioned words in
the manner Deazley contends, he certainly is correct that some persons
interpreted Donaldson as having rejected some type of antecedent right.
Apart from the sources already noted, there were others, though many of
them occurred in the course of advocacy. Advocates and judges in

209
MORNING CHRONICLE (London), May 16, 1774, at 4 (emphasis added); see also Cavendish,
supra note 160, at 35 (May 13, 1774).
210
34 H.C. JOUR. 590 (Mar. 24, 1774).
211
MORNING CHRONICLE (London), March 26, 1774, at 2 (emphasis added).
212
Id.
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Scotland were particularly keen to adopt this reading of Donaldson,213
which is no surprise given that the Court of Session had twice rejected a
common-law right in published works before Donaldson.214 Even there,
some variety appeared. In one case, for example, the Solicitor General of
Scotland argued on a common-law right in unpublished works stemming
from an author’s own labor.215 And in another case, one of the Lords of
Session stated that “[t]here is a literary property at common law.”216
In England, the perception of Donaldson was decidedly different from
that in Scotland. Nearly all the judges who opined on the matter adopted
the second or third reading of Donaldson. That is to say, they recognized
that the House had rejected perpetual copyright, but they then relied on the
answers of the judges in Donaldson, the views of the jurists in Millar, and
sometimes their own views in assessing whether an antecedent right
existed.217 Deazley argues that the judges taking this approach fundamentally misunderstood Donaldson. He labels the phenomenon the “emergence
and rise of . . . the cult of Millar and the re-branding of Donaldson.”218
Two decisions in particular deserve our attention because Deazley
identifies the first as principally responsible for causing subsequent
misconstructions of Donaldson, and the second as perpetuating the error.219
In the first case, Beckford v. Hood,220 the principal issue was whether
copyright holders of published works were limited to the penalties contained in the Statute of Anne or if they could pursue ordinary damages at
common law. Counsel for the plaintiff acknowledged that after Donaldson
an author could not, “after publication of his work, set up a common law
right” and that therefore it might appear that the common-law remedy was
unavailable.221 Counsel suggested, however, that the judges in Donaldson
213
Cadell v. Robertson, 19–20 Mor. Dec. Lit. Prop. Appx 16, 18–19 (Sess. 1804); Dodsley v.
M’Farquhar, 19–20 Mor. Dec. Lit. Prop. Appx 1, 3 (Sess. 1775).
214
Hinton v. Donaldson, 1 Hailes 535, cit. 5 Pat. App. 505, 5 Brown’s Supp. 508 (Sess. 1773);
Midwinter v. Hamilton, 2 Kames Rem. Dec. 154, Kilk. 96 (Sess. 1748); see also generally Hector L.
MacQueen, The War of the Booksellers: Natural Law, Equity, and Literary Property in EighteenthCentury Scotland, 35 J. LEGAL HIST. 231 (2014).
215
Cadell v. Stewart, 19–20 Mor. Dec. Lit. Prop. Appx 13, 13–14 (Sess. 1804); see also
INFORMATION FOR MESS. CADELL AND DAVIES 5–9 ([Edinburgh], D. Schaw & Son Sept. 30, 1803), SL
Session Papers 458:15.
216
Cadell v. Robertson, cit. 5 Pat. App. 498, 498–500 n.* (Sess. 1804) (Lord Hermand).
217
DEAZLEY, supra note 115, at 26–55. One possible exception is Lord Eldon. On appeal from
one of the Scottish cases mentioned previously, he stated that Donaldson had “declared that there was
no right of property at common law.” Cadell v. Robertson, 5 Pat. App. 498, 502 (H.L. 1811).
218
DEAZLEY, supra note 115, at 53.
219
Id. at 29–32, 53; Ronan Deazley, The Life of an Author: Samuel Egerton Brydges and the
Copyright Act 1814, 23 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 809, 813–16 (2006).
220
7 T.R. 620 (K.B. 1798).
221
Id. at 622. Importantly, of the six judges in Donaldson who opined that the statute preempted
any preexisting common-law right, five also answered that the statute precluded authors from pursuing
“every Remedy except on the Foundation of the said Statute, and on the Terms and Conditions
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had not really concerned themselves with the “specific remed[ies]”
available for infringement because they were principally focused on
whether the “right of property [was] confined to that given . . . by the
statute.”222 Turning next to the statute, he proceeded on the idea that the
legislature had created a statutory right in published works but that the
penalties and forfeitures were inadequate to vindicate that right. He thus
urged the court to import ordinary damages from the common law.223
The King’s Bench, which still counted Justice Ashurst among its
members, unanimously held that the common-law remedy was available.
The court ruled without having to ascertain the underlying reasoning of
Donaldson. Referring to the decision, Justice Ashurst stated that the
“question in the present case is much narrowed.”224 Nevertheless, two of
the judges did characterize Donaldson, and both took a narrow view of its
holding. Justice Grose stated that Donaldson established only that the
“common law right of action . . . could not be exercised beyond the time
limited by th[e] statute.”225 And the Chief Justice, Lord Kenyon, also
thought that Donaldson had not rejected a common-law right ab initio. As
a previously unremarked account of his opinion notes:
Lord KENYON said . . . [n]othing was more clear than at
Common Law, the author of injured civiliter was entitled to
his action . . . . With respect to the decision of the Twelve
Judges, six against five in the case alluded to, of Donaldson
against Becket, he would abstain from going into any
discussion of the grounds of it. All that was necessary to state
now was, that the law had been established; and some of the
rights of the author at Common Law were taken away by the
subsequent statutes.226
The second case, Jefferys v. Boosey,227 is perhaps the most instructive
because it ended up in the House of Lords in 1854 and provides, at its two
prescribed thereby.” 34 H.L. JOUR. 24 (Feb. 15, 1774); see also id. at 27–28, 30 (Feb. 17 & 21, 1774).
The sixth judge, Baron Eyre, stated that equitable remedies would additionally be available for
violations of the statute, but he did not mention ordinary damages. Id. at 24 (Feb. 15, 1774).
222
Beckford, 7 T.R. at 626.
223
Id. at 622–24.
224
Id. at 628.
225
Id. at 629; accord Beckford v. Hood, LI Dampier MS L.P.B. 222 (K.B. 1798) (Grose, J.) (“The
opinions of the \6/ Judges in Dom. Proc. must be \understood to be/ that after the 14 years or 28 years
there is no remedy at Com[mon] Law[.]”).
226
Beckford v. Hood (K.B. 1798), in ORACLE AND PUBLIC ADVERTISER (London), May 12, 1798,
at 3. Remarkably, it appears that defense counsel may have been of the same view. He stated that “the
Statutes[,] which had been made upon the subject, had taken away the rights which were vested in
authors by the Common Law.” Beckford v. Hood (K.B. 1798), in LONDON CHRONICLE, May 12, 1798,
at 3. On the reliability of newspaper reports of courts other than the House of Lords, see James
Oldham, Law Reporting in the London Newspapers, 1756–1786, 31 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 177 (1987).
227
4 H.L.C. 815 (H.L. 1854).
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principal stages, the views of numerous judges and law Lords on the
proper interpretation of Donaldson. At issue was whether a musical
composition written by a foreigner in Milan, and published in England
while the author still resided in Milan, was eligible for statutory protection
under the Copyright Act of 1842.228 The trial judge said no.229 On appeal to
the Exchequer Chamber, attended ad hoc by the justices of the Queen’s
Bench and Common Pleas, the plaintiff offered the common law as an
alternative.230 The lawyers on each side spun Donaldson in the way that
suited them best.231 The court opted to rule on statutory grounds and held
that the statute protected foreign works. It went on to state, however, that
“we are strongly inclined to agree with Lord Mansfield and the great
majority of the Judges, who, in Millar v. Taylor and Donaldson v. Becket,
declared themselves to be in favour of the common-law right of
authors.”232 Importantly, the seven justices in the Exchequer Chamber did
not treat the issue as having been decided by the House in Donaldson.233
The case eventually made its way to the House of Lords, which
reinstated the original judgment.234 The issue of common-law rights was
again discussed by counsel, the judges who were summoned for their advice, and the law Lords. Many of the judges avoided the issue outright, and
of those that did not, some inclined to the right and others against it. Nearly
all of them relied on the views of the judges in Donaldson and sometimes
those in Millar and other cases.235 But never once did the judges or law
Lords in Jefferys state that the House in Donaldson had decided the issue.
On the contrary, they read the holding narrowly, as Justice Blackstone had
in 1775, and they simply used the answers and opinions as guidance.
Justice Erle of the Court of Queen’s Bench, for example, noted that “[t]his
House decided in [Donaldson] that the statute had restricted the right to the
terms of years therein mentioned, but it left the question of copyright at
common law undecided.”236 And Lord Brougham, one of the law Lords
who was against the right, stated that “upon the general question of literary

228

An Act to Amend the Law of Copyright, 1842, 5 & 6 Vict., c. 45.
Boosey v. Jefferys, PRO E13/1366, rot. 63 (Exch. Pl. Mich. 1849; judg. Pas. 1850).
230
Boosey v. Jefferys, 6 Ex. 580, 583–86, 15 Jur. 540, 540–41 (Ct. Exch. Chamb. 1851).
231
6 Ex. at 583–85, 588, 15 Jur. at 541–42, 17 Law Times 110, 110–11; accord Jefferys, 4 H.L.C.
at 819, 823 (arg.).
232
6 Ex. at 592 (Lord Campbell, C.J.).
233
6 Ex. at 592–93, 15 Jur. at 543, 20 Law J. Exch. 354, 355; see also G.S., English Copyright in
Foreign Compositions, 14 JURIST 46, 47 (Feb. 16, 1850) (noting that “the ground of that decision
[Donaldson v. Becket] can only be surmised . . . [but] it is plain that [it] did not overrule the prior
decisions as to the effect of publication” at common law).
234
Jefferys, 4 H.L.C. at 996.
235
E.g., id. at 846–47 (Crompton, J.); id. at 874–75 (Erle, J.); id. at 883–84, 888 (Wightman, J.);
id. at 903, 906 (Coleridge, J.); id. at 920–21 (Parke, B.); id. at 945 (Jervis, C.J.).
236
Id. at 872 (Erle, J.).
229
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property at common law no judgment whatever was pronounced.”
The reports of Beckford and Jefferys do not mention the speeches of
the Lords in Donaldson, and thus we might be tempted to conclude that the
judges and law Lords were not aware of them. One could then argue that if
the speeches had been known, the jurists would have characterized
Donaldson differently. Given the nature of the publications in which the
case first appeared, access to the speeches many years later might be a
problem in some instances. Nevertheless, the underlying premise arguably
does not hold because it is more likely than not that in Beckford and
Jefferys the judges and law Lords were aware of the speeches. Beckford
was argued before a judge who had participated in Donaldson, and an
account of the speeches was readily available as part of a major publication
on the debates and proceedings of both Houses.238 The speeches later became even more accessible to all of those involved in Jefferys because they
were reprinted once more in what had, by then, become the standard work
on parliamentary debates from 1066 to 1803.239 Indeed, it seems very
unlikely that the law Lords, in particular, would have failed to consult this
work, which was housed in the library of the House of Lords.240
In short, I view the aforementioned cases not as mistaken, as my
colleague does, but as correctly assessing what was decided in Donaldson
and what was not.
VI. CONCLUSION
So what, then, is the correct way to describe the holding in Donaldson?
The House of Lords held that published works were subject to the
durational terms of the Statute of Anne, but the reasoning of the decision
cannot be determined. In advising the House, a number of judges and
Lords offered their own views of the matter, but none of them singly or in
combination establishes why the House ruled as it did. Nevertheless, they
do stand as guidance on what the law was at the time. In this respect, I
must again agree with Lysander Spooner, who 160 years ago wrote:
[Donaldson] does not stand as a decision that an author had
237

Id. at 961 (Lord Brougham); see also id. at 968–69.
See 7 HISTORY, supra note 84, at i, 2.
239
See 17 COBBETT, supra note 87, at col. 953.
240
See CHRISTOPHER DOBSON, THE LIBRARY OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS: A SHORT HISTORY 5–6
(1960); MS Catalogue of the Library of the House of Lords, c.1848, PA HL/PO/LB/1/41. The Gentleman’s Magazine, which contained a report of Lord Camden’s speech and which was well known at the
time to carry parliamentary debates, also was available in the Lords’ Library. Catalogue, supra, PA
HL/PO/LB/1/41. Presumably, counsel for the appellant in Jefferys had access to the speeches. He
argued that the House in Donaldson had rejected an antecedent right—a position that is hard if not
impossible to justify based on the judges’ answers or opinions alone. Jefferys, 4 H.L.C. at 823 (arg.);
see also CASE FOR THE PLAINTIFF IN ERROR 4 ([London], W. Ostell [1852]), PA HL/PO/JU/4/3/135.
238
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not a perpetual copyright at common law; but only as a
decision that, if he had such a right at common law, that right
had been taken away by the statute.
The diversity of opinion, both among the judges and the
lords, deprive this decision of all weight as an authority. The
only things really worthy of consideration are the arguments
urged on the one side and the other.241
As I have already noted, it was common for observers in the late 18th
century to read Donaldson and Millar as predominating in favor of an
antecedent right. This is not surprising. On the strict interpretation of
Donaldson, Millar remained relevant. And if one combines the views of
the judges and law Lords from both cases, a majority believed that there
was a common-law copyright before publication, a slim majority believed
it was not lost upon publication, and a majority believed the Statute of
Anne preempted one or both types of antecedent rights. This is not to say
that only quantitative measures matter. Undoubtedly, in the minds of some
observers there is a qualitative component as well, wherein experience and
reputations come into play. Nevertheless, on the whole, the orthodox origin
of copyright—that authors held a natural or customary property right,
protected at common law—certainly finds support in the late 18th century.
A final word. Although I disagree with Abrams and Deazley as to the
true import of Donaldson, they do correctly point out that many modern
scholars have misread the decision in the other direction by stating that the
House of Lords affirmatively held that there was an antecedent right. Most
instances of this phenomenon, undoubtedly, are accidental and arise from
the mistaken belief that in 1774 the judges were solely empowered to
decide appeals in the House of Lords, i.e., that the judges were the House.
In any case, in light of the foregoing, it is hoped that this too is something
that will be avoided in the future.

241

SPOONER, supra note 171, at 212–13; accord JOHN SHORTT, THE LAW RELATING TO WORKS
(London, H. Cox 1871).
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APPENDIX
The sections below collate—in order of the arguments, opinions, and
speeches—the various reports that were published. Generally speaking,
they fall into three categories: narratives (“N”), summaries (“S”), and tallies
(“T”). A narrative offers some account of what was said. Many narratives
are lengthy, some over 1,000 words, but others are very short. Summaries
are always very brief and merely summarize the position a speaker took,
e.g., that Justice Gould believed that there was a common-law right, but
that the Statute of Anne preempted it. Tallies track the judges who opined
for or against perpetual copyright. The number of surviving summaries and
tallies are numerous. Indeed, there are so many that to list them all for
every counsel, judge, and Lord would carry this Appendix to over 20
pages. Consequently, only the section on Justice Nares lists sources of all
three types. For the remaining participants, I only include narratives.242
Under each speaker there are one or more main entries; each main
entry contains material that is unique in some respect. In the case of lengthier narratives, we can state with confidence that the source is not only
unique but original. That is to say, someone with actual knowledge of the
proceedings likely created it. As the reports become shorter, however, it
becomes difficult and in some cases impossible to determine if the source
is based on original reporting or is merely copied from another paper.
Indentations indicate a source that is clearly derivative of the tier above
it. Most derivatives are verbatim, while others truncate, paraphrase, or
otherwise excerpt material. Generally speaking, I have avoided breaking
down the sources beyond a single level of derivation, even in instances
where I could confidently determine that a source merited as much,
because to offer so much detail here would cause the Appendix to become
unwieldy. There would need to be numerous second, third, and fourth tiers
of derivation and indentation. I do make a few exceptions, however, for
some of the principal accounts, viz., the Cases and Cobbett Accounts.
If two sources are marked with an “=” that means they are so similar
and close in time that it is likely that they used the same correspondents for
their reports. Additionally, some newspaper reports draw from more than
one source, and some newspaper issues contain more than one report. This
Appendix lists the various sources in order of publication dates and times
(morning, followed by evening) and otherwise alphabetically.
A full list of all the newspapers and periodicals consulted, that contain
material on Donaldson v. Becket, appears at the end of this Appendix.
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When time permits, I will publish a variorum report of Donaldson v. Becket.
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Arguments
For the Appellants
February 4, 1774

February 7, 1774

1. Edward Thurlow, AG

2. John Dalrymple

N

N

London Chron., Feb. 5
St. James Chron. (Eve), Feb. 5
Reading Mercury, Feb. 7
Caledonian Mercury, Feb. 9
Stamford Mercury, Feb. 10
Derby Mercury, Feb. 11
Edinburgh Adv., Feb. 11
Newcastle Courant, Feb. 12
Shrewsbury Chron., Feb. 12
Gent. & Lady’s Weekly, Feb. 18
Cobbett Account
N
Morning Chron. Feb. 5
General Eve. Post, Feb. 5
Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Feb. 9
Edinburgh Adv., Feb. 11
Aberdeen J., Feb. 14
Gent. & Lady’s Weekly, Feb. 18
Gentleman’s Magazine, Feb.
Sentimental Magazine, Feb.
Town & Country Magazine, Feb.
Pleadings Account
Cases Account
Gent. & London Magazine, Mar.
Scots Magazine, Mar.
Cobbett Account
N
Middlesex J. (Eve), Feb. 5
N
Edinburgh Adv., Feb. 8
Gent. & Lady’s Weekly, Feb. 11
N
Caledonian Mercury, Feb. 9
Aberdeen J., Feb. 14
N
Pleadings Account
Cases Account

Gazetteer, Feb. 8
=London Chron., Feb. 8
General Eve. Post, Feb. 8
London Eve. Post, Feb. 8
Craftsman, Feb. 12
Newcastle Courant, Feb. 12
Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Feb. 12
Hampshire Chron., Feb. 14
Manchester Mercury, Feb. 15
N
Morning Chron., Feb. 8
Town & Country Magazine, Feb.
Pleadings Account
Cases Account
N
Middlesex J. (Eve), Feb. 8
Pleadings Account
243
Cases Account
N
London Chron., Feb. 10
Gentleman’s Magazine, Feb.
Town & Country Magazine, Feb.
Gent. & London Magazine, Mar.
Scots Magazine, Mar.
Cobbett Account
N
Edinburgh Adv., Feb. 11
Aberdeen J., Feb. 21
N
Morning Chron., Feb. 11
N
Caledonian Mercury, Feb. 12
Gent. & Lady’s Weekly, Feb. 18

243
This account inserts an imaginary act of Parliament—An Act for the Encouragement of
Planting—that Dalrymple used during argument but that was expressly omitted from the Middlesex
Journal and Pleadings Account. The invented act probably circulated separately in print, for the use of
the Lords, but no stand-alone copies appear to have survived. CASES, supra note 76, at 22–24.
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For the Respondents
February 8, 1774
3. Alexander Wedderburn, SG

4. John Dunning

N

N

Gazetteer, Feb. 9
General Eve. Post, Feb. 10
London Eve. Post, Feb. 10
Craftsman, Feb. 12
Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Feb. 14
Stamford Mercury, Feb. 17
Derby Mercury, Feb. 18
N
Morning Chron., Feb. 9
London Chron., Feb. 10
Cobbett Account
Sentimental Magazine, Feb.
Pleadings Account
Cases Account244
Scots Magazine, Mar.
N
Caledonian Mercury, Feb. 12
Gent. & Lady’s Weekly, Feb. 18
N
Middlesex J. (Eve), Feb. 12
Town & Country Magazine, Feb.
N
Edinburgh Adv., Feb. 15
Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Feb. 16
Aberdeen J., Feb. 21

Gazetteer, Feb. 9
General Eve. Post, Feb. 10
London Eve. Post, Feb. 10
Craftsman, Feb. 12
Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Feb. 14
Stamford Mercury, Feb. 17
Derby Mercury, Feb. 18
N
Morning Chron., Feb. 9
London Chron., Feb. 10
Cobbett Account
Leeds Intelligencer, Feb. 15
Gentleman’s Magazine, Feb.
Sentimental Magazine, Feb.
Town & Country Magazine, Feb.
Pleadings Account
Cases Account
Gent. & London Magazine, Mar.
Scots Magazine, Mar.
N
Public Adv., Feb. 9
Ipswich J., Feb. 12
N
Middlesex J. (Eve), Feb. 10
Public Hue & Cry, Feb. 11
Pleadings Account
Cases Account
N
Caledonian Mercury, Feb. 12
Gent. & Lady’s Weekly, Feb. 18
N
Edinburgh Adv., Feb. 15
Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Feb. 16
Aberdeen J., Feb. 21

244
This account briefly mentions a case, Baskett v. Woodfall, PRO C33/417, ff. 337v–338r (Ch.
1762), that was not mentioned in the Pleadings Account. CASES, supra note 76, at 28.
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For the Appellants—Reply
February 9, 1774
5. Edward Thurlow, AG
N

London Chron., Feb. 10
=Public Adv., Feb. 10
Jackson’s Oxford J., Feb. 12
Northampton Mercury, Feb. 14
Edinburgh Adv., Feb. 15
Dublin J., Feb. 17
Aberdeen J., Feb. 21
N
Morning Chron., Feb. 10
London Chron., Feb. 12
Cobbett Account
Scots Magazine, Mar.
N
Middlesex J. (Eve), Feb. 10
Public Hue & Cry, Feb. 11
N
Caledonian Mercury, Feb. 14

N

Edinburgh Adv., Feb. 15
Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Feb. 16
Aberdeen J., Feb. 21

Questions Posed to the Judges
February 9, 1774
London Chron., Feb. 10
General Eve. Post, Feb. 10
London Eve. Post, Feb. 10
St. James Chron. (Eve), Feb. 10
Gazetteer, Feb. 11
Craftsman, Feb. 12
Ipswich J., Feb. 12
Jackson’s Oxford J., Feb. 12
Caledonian Mercury, Feb. 14
Hampshire Chron., Feb. 14
Northampton Mercury, Feb. 14
Reading Mercury, Feb. 14
Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Feb. 14
Bath Chron., Feb. 17
Dublin J., Feb. 17
Stamford Mercury, Feb. 17
Derby Mercury, Feb. 18
Gent. & Lady’s Weekly, Feb. 18
Newcastle Courant, Feb. 19
Aberdeen J., Feb. 21
London Magazine, Feb.
Annual Register 1774

†

Morning Chron., Feb. 10†
Edinburgh Adv., Feb. 15
Gentleman’s Magazine, Feb.
Sentimental Magazine, Feb.
Town & Country Magazine, Feb.
Pleadings Account
Cases Account
Gent. & London Magazine, Mar.
Scots Magazine, Mar.
Public Adv., Feb. 10
Middlesex J. (Eve), Feb. 10
Public Hue & Cry, Feb. 11
Public Register, Feb. 17
Morning Chron., Feb. 15†
Printed Journal†
Cobbett Account

These sources (and their derivatives) are nearly identical.
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Opinions
February 15, 1774
1. Baron James Eyre, EX

2. Justice George Nares, CP

N

S

Morning Chron., Feb. 16
Middlesex J. (Eve), Feb. 17
Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Feb. 23
Sentimental Magazine, Feb.
N
London Chron., Feb. 17
Edinburgh Adv., Feb. 22
Weekly Magazine, Feb. 24
Gent. & Lady’s Weekly, Feb. 25
Gentleman’s Magazine, Feb.
Pleadings Account
Cases Account
Gent. & London Magazine, Mar.
Scots Magazine, Apr.
Cobbett Account
N
Caledonian Mercury, Feb. 19
Glasgow J., Feb. 24
N
Gentleman’s Magazine, Feb.
Pleadings Account
Cases Account
Gent. & London Magazine, Mar.

3. Justice William Ashurst, KB
N

Morning Chron., Feb. 16
London Chron., Feb. 17
Cobbett Account
Middlesex J. (Eve), Feb. 17
Edinburgh Adv., Feb. 22
Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Feb. 23
Weekly Magazine, Feb. 24
Gent. & Lady’s Weekly, Feb. 25
Sentimental Magazine, Feb.
Pleadings Account
Cases Account
Gentleman’s Magazine, Mar.
Gent. & London Magazine, Apr.
Scots Magazine, Apr.
N
Public Adv., Feb. 16
Ipswich J., Feb. 19
Town & Country Magazine, Feb.
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Gazetteer, Feb. 16
General Eve. Post, Feb. 17
London Eve. Post, Feb. 17
Craftsman, Feb. 19
Jackson’s Oxford J., Feb. 19
Westminster J., Feb. 19
Hampshire Chron., Feb. 21
Derby Mercury, Feb. 25
N
Morning Chron., Feb. 16
London Chron., Feb. 17
Cobbett Account
Middlesex J. (Eve), Feb. 17
Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Feb. 23
Gent. & Lady’s Weekly, Feb. 25
Sentimental Magazine, Feb.
Pleadings Account
Cases Account
Gentleman’s Magazine, Mar.
Gent. & London Magazine, Apr.
Scots Magazine, Apr.
S
Public Adv., Feb. 16 245
Ipswich J., Feb. 19
T
Bath Chron., Feb. 17
S
Caledonian Mercury, Feb. 19†
Glasgow J., Feb. 24†
T
Jackson’s Oxford J., Feb. 19
=Public Adv., Feb. 19
Glocester J., Feb. 21
Northampton Mercury, Feb. 21
Reading Mercury, Feb. 21
Leeds Intelligencer, Feb. 22
Manchester Mercury, Feb. 22
Bath Chron., Feb. 24
S
Shrewsbury Chron., Feb. 19
T
Westminster J., Feb. 19
General Eve. Post, Feb. 19
London Eve. Post, Feb. 19
Middlesex J. (Eve), Feb. 19
St. James Chron. (Eve), Feb. 19
Hampshire Chron., Feb. 21

Woodfall was likely the source for the Public Advertiser. See supra notes 144 & 167.
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4. Justice William Blackstone, CP
There are no published opinions or
narratives for Justice Blackstone.
Blackstone was ill with the gout, so
Justice Ashurst read his answers to
246
the Lords. All that remains is
brief summaries and tallies, which
are not reproduced here.
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Stamford Mercury, Feb. 24
Derby Mercury, Feb. 25
Newcastle Courant, Feb. 26
Dublin J., Mar. 1
Public Register, Mar. 1
T
Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Feb. 19†
S
Edinburgh Adv., Feb. 22†
Weekly Magazine, Feb. 24†
Aberdeen J., Feb. 28†
T
Public Adv., Feb. 22
Middlesex J. (Eve), Feb. 22
Jackson’s Oxford J., Feb. 26
Hampshire Chron., Feb. 28
Leinster J., Mar. 5
Public Register, Mar. 5
T
Caledonian Mercury, Feb. 23†
Aberdeen J., Feb. 28†
T
Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Feb. 23†
Gent. & Lady’s Weekly, Feb. 25†
Aberdeen J., Feb. 28†
T
Edinburgh Adv., Feb. 25†
Aberdeen J., Feb. 28†
S
Town & Country Magazine, Feb.†
T
Westminster Magazine, Feb.
T
Scots Magazine, Apr.
S
Burrow Report†
T
Brown Report†
S
Printed Journal†

February 17, 1774
5. Justice Edward Willes, KB

6. Justice Richard Aston, KB

N

N

Morning Chron., Feb. 18
London Chron., Feb. 19
Cobbett Account
Sentimental Magazine, Feb.
Pleadings Account
Cases Account
Gentleman’s Magazine, Mar.
Gent. & London Magazine, Apr.
Scots Magazine, Apr.

Morning Chron., Feb. 18 & 19
London Chron., Feb. 19 & 22
Cobbett Account
Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Feb. 26
Sentimental Magazine, Feb.
Pleadings Account
Cases Account
Gentleman’s Magazine, Mar.
Gent. & London Magazine, Apr.
Scots Magazine, Apr.
Cobbett Account

246
WEEKLY MAGAZINE (Edinburgh), Feb. 24, 1774, at 286 (“He only answered the questions in
general, without going into the argument.”).
†
These sources agree with the manuscript journal on Justice Nares’s views.
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7. Baron George Perrot, EX

8. Justice Henry Gould, CP

N

N

Morning Chron., Feb. 19
London Chron., Feb. 22
Cobbett Account
Edin. Eve. Courant, Feb. 26 & Mar. 2
Pleadings Account
Cases Account
Gentleman’s Magazine, Mar.
Gent. & London Magazine, Apr.
Scots Magazine, Apr.
N
Edinburgh Adv., Feb. 22
Edinburgh Eve., Feb. 23
Weekly Magazine, Feb. 24
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Morning Chron., Feb. 21
London Chron., Feb. 24
Cobbett Account
Sentimental Magazine, Feb.
Pleadings Account
Cases Account
Gentleman’s Magazine, Mar.
Gent. & London Magazine, Apr.
Scots Magazine, Apr.
N
Edinburgh Adv., Feb. 22
Edinburgh Eve., Feb. 23
Weekly Magazine, Feb. 24

9. Baron Richard Adams, EX
N

Morning Chron., Feb. 21
London Chron., Feb. 24
Cobbett Account
Sentimental Magazine, Feb.
Weekly Magazine, Mar. 3
Pleadings Account
Cases Account
Gentleman’s Magazine, Mar.
Gent. & London Magazine, Apr.
Scots Magazine, Apr.
N
Edinburgh Adv., Feb. 22
Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Feb. 23
Weekly Magazine, Feb. 24
N
Caledonian Mercury, Feb. 23

February 21, 1774
10. Chief Baron Sidney Smythe, EX

11. Ch. J. William De Grey, CP

N

N

Morning Chron., Feb. 22
London Chron., Feb. 24
Town & Country Magazine, Feb.
Weekly Magazine, Mar. 3
Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Mar. 7
Pleadings Account
Cases Account
Gentleman’s Magazine, Mar.
Cobbett Account
Gent. & London Magazine, Apr.
Scots Magazine, Apr.

Public Adv., Feb. 22
Middlesex J. (Eve), Feb. 22
St. James Chron. (Eve), Feb. 22
Shrewsbury Chron., Feb. 26
Hampshire Chron., Feb. 28
Reading Mercury, Feb. 28
Westminster Magazine, Feb.
Dublin J., Mar. 3
N
Morning Chron., Feb. 23
Town & Country Magazine, Feb.
Pleadings Account
Cases Account
Gentleman’s Magazine, Apr.
Cobbett Account
Scots Magazine, Apr.
Gent. & London Magazine, May
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N

London Chron., Feb. 24
Weekly Magazine, Mar. 3
N
Edinburgh Adv., Feb. 25
Caledonian Mercury, Feb. 26
Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Feb. 26

Speeches
February 22, 1774
1. Charles Pratt, Lord Camden

2. Henry Bathurst, L.C. Apsley

N

N

Public Adv., Feb. 23
London Chron., Feb. 24
Ipswich J., Feb. 26
Jackson’s Oxford J., Feb. 26
Shrewsbury Chron., Feb. 26
Glocester J., Feb. 28
Manchester Mercury, Mar. 1
Bath Chron., Mar. 3
Derby Mercury, Mar. 4
Dublin J., Mar. 5
Leinster J., Mar. 9
Hibernian Magazine, Mar.
N
Morning Chron., Feb. 24 & 25
London Chron., Feb. 26 & Mar. 1
Cobbett Account
St. James’s Magazine, Feb.
Town & Country Magazine, Feb.
Edinburgh Adv., Mar. 4
Caledonian Mercury, Mar. 7 & 9
Pleadings Account
Cases Account
Weekly Magazine, Mar. 10
Gent. & Lady’s Weekly, Mar. 11
Gent. & London Magazine, Mar.
Gentleman’s Magazine, Apr.
Scots Magazine, May
N
London Eve. Post, Feb. 24
=Middlesex J. (Eve), Feb. 24
Northampton Mercury, Feb. 28
Reading Mercury, Feb. 28
Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Feb. 28
Leeds Intelligencer, Mar. 1
Newcastle Courant, Mar. 5
Public Register, Mar. 5
Universal Magazine, Mar.
Debrett Account
N
Caledonian Mercury, Feb. 26
Glasgow J., Mar. 3
Aberdeen J., Mar. 7

Public Adv., Feb. 23
London Chron., Feb. 24
Ipswich J., Feb. 26
Jackson’s Oxford J., Feb. 26
Shrewsbury Chron., Feb. 26
Glocester J., Feb. 28
Manchester Mercury, Mar. 1
Bath Chron., Mar. 3
Derby Mercury, Mar. 4
Dublin J., Mar. 5
Leinster J., Mar. 9
Scots Magazine, May
N
London Eve. Post, Feb. 24
=Middlesex J. (Eve), Feb. 24
Northampton Mercury, Feb. 28
Reading Mercury, Feb. 28
Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Feb. 28
Leeds Intelligencer, Mar. 1
Newcastle Courant, Mar. 5
Public Register, Mar. 5
Universal Magazine, Mar.
Debrett Account
N
Caledonian Mercury, Feb. 26.
Glasgow J., Mar. 3
Aberdeen J., Mar. 7
N
Morning Chron., Feb. 26
London Chron., Mar. 5
Cobbett Account
Pleadings Account
Cases Account
Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Mar. 9
N
Edinburgh Adv., Mar. 1
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N

London Eve. Post, Feb. 26
Bath Chron., Mar. 3
N
Edinburgh Adv., Mar. 1

3. Thomas Lyttelton, Lord Lyttelton

4. Edmund Law, Bishop of Carlisle

N

N

London Eve. Post, Feb. 24
=Middlesex J. (Eve), Feb. 24
Northampton Mercury, Feb. 28
Reading Mercury, Feb. 28
Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Feb. 28
Edinburgh Adv., Mar. 1
Leeds Intelligencer, Mar. 1
Newcastle Courant, Mar. 5
Public Register, Mar. 5
Universal Magazine, Mar.
Debrett Account
Cobbett Account
N
Morning Chron., Feb. 26
Pleadings Account
Cases Account
N
General Eve. Post, Mar. 10

London Eve. Post, Feb. 24
=Middlesex J. (Eve), Feb. 24
Northampton Mercury, Feb. 28
Reading Mercury, Feb. 28
Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Feb. 28
Leeds Intelligencer, Mar. 1
Newcastle Courant, Mar. 5
Public Register, Mar. 5
Universal Magazine, Mar.
Debrett Account
Cobbett Account
N
Morning Chron., Feb. 26
Pleadings Account
Cases Account
N
General Eve. Post, Mar. 10

5. Thomas Howard, Earl of Effingham
N

Public Adv., Feb. 23
London Chron., Feb. 24
Ipswich J., Feb. 26
Jackson’s Oxford J., Feb. 26
Shrewsbury Chron., Feb. 26
Glocester J., Feb. 28
Manchester Mercury, Mar. 1
Bath Chron., Mar. 3
Derby Mercury, Mar. 4
Dublin J., Mar. 5
Leinster J., Mar. 9
Hibernian Magazine, Mar.
Scots Magazine, May
N
London Eve. Post, Feb. 24
=Middlesex J. (Eve), Feb. 24
Northampton Mercury, Feb. 28
Reading Mercury, Feb. 28
Edinburgh Eve. Courant, Feb. 28
Leeds Intelligencer, Mar. 1
Newcastle Courant, Mar. 5
Public Register, Mar. 5
Universal Magazine, Mar.
Debrett Account
Cobbett Account

N

Morning Chron., Feb. 26
London Eve. Post, Feb. 26
Stamford Mercury, Mar. 3
Westminster J., Mar. 5
Pleadings Account
Cases Account
N
General Eve. Post, Mar. 10
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Full Names of British and Irish Newspapers and Periodicals
that Contain Material on Donaldson v. Becket
England
The Annual Register, or a View of the History, Politics, and Literature, For
the Year 1774 (London)
The Bath Chronicle
The Craftsman; or Say’s Weekly Journal (London)
Drewry’s Derby Mercury
The Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser (London)
The General Evening Post (London)
The Gentleman’s Magazine, and Historical Chronicle (London)
The Glocester Journal
The Hampshire Chronicle: Or, Winchester, Southampton, and Portsmouth
Mercury (Southampton)
The Ipswich Journal
Jackson’s Oxford Journal
The Lady’s Magazine; or Entertaining Companion for the Fair Sex
(London)
The Leeds Intelligencer
The London Chronicle
The London Evening-Post
The London Magazine: Or, Gentleman’s Monthly Intelligencer
The Manchester Mercury and Harrop’s General Advertiser
Middlesex Journal, and Evening Advertiser (London)
The Monthly Review; or, Literary Journal: From July to December 1774
(London)
The Morning Chronicle, and London Advertiser
The Morning Post, and Daily Advertiser (London)
The Newcastle Courant
The Northampton Mercury
The Public Advertiser (London)
The Public Hue and Cry; or, Sir John Fielding’s General Preventive Plan
(London)
The Reading Mercury, and Oxford Gazette (Reading)
The St. James’s Chronicle; Or, British Evening-Post (London)
The St. James’s Magazine: or Memoirs of Our Own Times (London)
The Sentimental Magazine; or, General Assemblage of Science, Taste, and
Entertainment (London)
The Shrewsbury Chronicle, Or, Wood’s British Gazette
The Stamford Mercury
The Town and Country Magazine; or Universal Repository of Knowledge,
Instruction, and Entertainment (London)
The Universal Magazine of Knowledge and Pleasure (London)
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The Weekly Magazine; or, Polite Register of Literature, Politics and News
(London)247
The Westminster Journal: And London Political Miscellany (London)248
The Westminster Magazine; or, The Pantheon of Taste (London)
Scotland
The Aberdeen Journal; and North-British Magazine
The Caledonian Mercury (Edinburgh)
The Edinburgh Advertiser
The Edinburgh Evening Courant
The Edinburgh Magazine and Review
The Gentleman and Lady’s Weekly Magazine (Edinburgh)249
Glasgow Journal
The Scots Magazine (Edinburgh)
The Weekly Magazine, or Edinburgh Amusement
Ireland
The Dublin Journal, George Faulkner
The Gentleman’s and London Magazine: or, Monthly Chronologer
(Dublin)
Hibernian Magazine, or Compendium of Entertaining Knowledge (Dublin)
The Leinster Journal (Kilkenny), Edmund Finn
The Public Register: Or, Freeman’s Journal (Dublin)

247
I was unable to review this periodical because the relevant issues appear to have perished.
Should they ever reappear, an advertisement indicates that issue 5 reported the principal arguments of
counsel on both sides. MORNING POST (London), Feb. 14, 1774, at 1 (advertisement).
248
I was unable to locate a surviving copy of the February 26 issue of this weekly periodical.
249
I was unable to locate a surviving copy of the March 4 or 18 issues of this weekly periodical.

